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LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY INTO POLITICAL ACTIVITY: FIRST
AMENDMENT IMMUNITY FROM COMMITTEE
INTERROGATION
SINCE the seventeenth century legislators have armed committees with sub-
poena powers to obtain information for a variety of legislative purposes.' One
of the oldest and most controversial of the committees' functions has been in-
vestigation of government scandals and identification of persons responsible for
official mismanagement. Such investigations were set back in 1880 when the
Supreme Court appeared to declare them unconstitutional usurpations of the
judicial power to try and punish crimes.2 But in the nineteen-twenties the
Court retreated before the scholarly articles of leading members of the Bar who
acclaimed Congress' expos6 of the Teapot Dome Scandal.3 Impressed by the
committees' long pedigree and their skill in scourging official corruption, the
Court refused to question whether the actual motive of the investigators was
exposure rather than legislation.4 Backed by a judicial policy of noninterfer-
ence, the committees flourished.0 Culprits identified were jailed if the legis-
1. For general treatment of the history of legislative investigating committees see
BARTH, GOVERNMENT BY INVESTIGATION (1955) ; DI moCK, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATING
CommiTTTEs (1929); TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST (1955); Landis, Constitutional Limitations
on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARv. L. REv. 153 (1926). For studies
of particular investigations of politics see CARR, THE HOUSE CoMM T nE ON UN-AMERIcAN
AcTiVITIES 1945-1950 (1952) ; OGDEN, THE DIES CoMMITTEE (1945) ; and the series of
books published by the Cornell University Press under the editorship of Professor Gell-
horn: BARRETT, THE TENNEY COMMITTEE (1951); CHAMBERLAIN, LOYALTY AND LEGIS-
LATIVE ACTION (1951) (Rapp-Coudert and Lusk Committees in New York) ; COUNTRY-
MAN, UN-AMERIcAN ACTIVITIES IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON (1951); THE STATES
AND SUBVERSION (Gellhorn ed. 1952) (miscellaneous committees).
The term "legislative investigating committee" will be used in this Comment to mean
a committee composed of federal or state legislators authorized to compel testimony on
penalty of contempt. It does not include legislative committees authorized to hold hearings
on pending bills but unable to compel attendance of unwilling witnesses.
2. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
3. E.g., Frankfurter, Hands Off the Investigations, New Republic, May 21, 1924, p. 329;
Landis, supra note 1; Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U.
PA. L. REV. 691 (1926). Even those critical of the particular investigation praised the in-
stitution itself. E.g., Wigmore, Comment, 19 ILI. L. REv. 452 (1925).
4. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) ; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S.
263 (1928).
The actual retreat may have begun earlier in In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 669 (1896)
(allowing hostile investigation of senator's broker), but it was not until McGrain and
Sinclair, supra, that the Supreme Court announced it would not look behind the purported
purpose of investigators to discover their actual goal. Long after the Chapman case federal
judges still thought Kilbourn v. Thompson was a prohibition against hostile investigation
of private persons. Ex parte Daugherty, 229 Fed. 620 (S.D. Ohio 1924).
5. In this period, protests by recalcitrant witnesses against investigation were almost
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lative power to punish contempt reached their offenses ;6 if it did not, commit-
tees used the weapon of denunciation and the lash of public opinionZ
The committees not only flourished; they changed markedly in both power
and scope. With money,8 manpower 9 and media 10 at their disposal, the com-
mittees now reach a larger audience with sharper impact than ever before.
universally unsuccessful in the courts. E.g., United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349
(1950) ; United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950) ; United States v. Norris, 300 U.S.
564 (1936) ; Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935) ; Barry v. United States cx rcl.
Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1928); Marshall v. United States, 176 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 933 (1950) ; Morford v. United States, 176 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir.
1949), rev'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 258, second trial, 184 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 878 (1950) ; Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 934 (1950) ; United States v. Dennis, 171 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1948), aff'd
(cert. limited to other issues), 339 U.S. 162 (1950) ; Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 273
(D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. dismissed as moot, 338 U.S. 883 (1949); Townsend v. United
States, 95 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1938); United States v. Groves, 18 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. Pa.
1937) ; and cases cited notes 33, 42 infra. But see Ex parte Frankfeld, 32 F. Supp. 915
(D.D.C. 1940) (contumacious witness released where proceedings against him were insti-
tuted by mere employee of House Un-American Activities Committee). See, generally,
TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST 58-70 (1955).
6. In addition to their power to punish witnesses who refuse without good reason to
give testimony needed by an investigating committee, see note 111 infra, legislatures may
also punish as contempt efforts to disturb the order or decorum of the body and attempts
to harm, bribe or defame the members of the chamber. See, generally, Potts, supra note 3,
at 780, 789-90.
7. For example, in the wake of the Teapot Dome investigation three cabinet officers
resigned and two persons committed suicide. ROGERS, THE AmmcAN SENATE 207 (1926),
quoted in Junz, Congressional Investigating Committees, 21 SOCiAL REsEARCH 379, 390
n.18 (1954).
8. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1956, p. 18, col. 5 (House of Representatives appropriated
$860,000 for three probes) ; N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1956, p. 20, col. 1 (Senate appropriated
$726,000 for one probe). The McCarthy Subcommittee (the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations) had an appropriation
of $209,156.08 in the 83rd Congress. 99 CONG. REc. 9028 (1953). State committees have
also handled large sums in the past. See CHMBm.AIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 77
($250,000 budget of Rapp-Coudert Committee) ; COUNTRYMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 162
($140,600 budget of Tenney Committee).
9. The McCarthy Subcommittee had twenty-two paid employees on July 10, 1953. 99
CONG. REc. 9028 (1953). The House Un-American Activities Committee had forty-two
paid employees as of June 30, 1954. 100 CONG. Rxc. 13182 (1954).
10. Committees investigating political matters have often broadcast their public hear-
ings. E.g., Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 19, 1953, p. 6, cols. 7-8 (listing Senate hear-
ing among radio programs) ; Hearings on Communist Party Activities in Western Penn-
sylvania, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Govern-
inent Operations [McCarthy Subcommittee], 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1953). The greatest
controversy has arisen over the use of television. See TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST 247-52
(1955). In one district court case a witness cited for contempt in refusing to answer ques-
tions before television cameras was acquitted on the theory that the efforts to televise the
hearings were so distracting that he could not have given accurate answers. United States
v. Kleinman, 107 F. Supp. 407 (D.D.C. 1952).
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They have become semi-permanent bureaucracies,"- accumulating experience 12
and perfecting publicity techniques. They screen witnesses in executive ses-
sion 13 to cull their most sensational testimony for later repetition to the press
and camera,1 4 and whole investigations are produced and directed for the ut-
most in theatrical effect.' 0 Often the committees cooperate with other groups,' 6
11. Most investigating committees are created ad hoc and last only long enough to
report on one particular problem. But several committees investigating political matters
have been created with indefinite tenure. California's Un-American Activities Committee
lasted eight years under the same chairman. BARRETr, op. cit. supra note 1, at 14. The
House Un-American Activities Committee has been in existence since 1938 and was made
an organic part of Congress in 1945. CARR, op. cit. supra note 1, at vi. Several permanent
committees of the Senate have permanent subcommittees that have made a specialty of
investigating subversion. E.g., Senate Judiciary Committee's Special Subcommittee on
Internal Security; Senate Government Operations Committee's Subcommittee on Investi-
gations. See 1 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEvs xxxv, xxxviii (1955). All Senate subcom-
mittees have investigating powers. 60 STAr. 831-32 (1946), 2 U.S.C. § 190(b) (Supp. 1955).
The way in which the staff of the House Un-American Activities Committee conducts a
regular business of investigation and expos6 is treated at length in CAR, op. cit. supra
note 1, c. VII.
12. See, e.g., COUNTRYMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 79-85 (J. B. Matthews, former
research director of the Dies Committee, helped along the infant Canwell Committee in
Washington State). Harsha, The Broyles Commission, in THE STATES AND SUBVERSION
68-69 (Gellhorn ed. 1952) (liaison maintained by other fledgling state un-American activi-
ties committees with the House Committee).
13. An executive session is an official committee meeting from which the public and
press are excluded. Witnesses may or may not be examined. 60 STAT. 831 (1946), 2
U.S.C. § 190(a) (Supp. 1955). See, generally, TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST 244-47 (1955).
14. E.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1955, p. 1, col. 1, p. 8, col. 3. See, generally, TAYLOR,
GRAND INQUEST 246 (1955).
Executive session questioning of hostile witnesses is sometimes used much like deposi-
tions and discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Witnesses who later re-
tract their executive session testimony in public hearings may be contradicted by the com-
mittee counsel, reading their former testimony into the public session record. E.g., Hear-
ings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations: Security-Government Printing Office, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1953)
(hereinafter cited as Government Printing Office Hearings).
15. For examples see CARR, op. cit. supra note 1, at 55-78; The Progressive, April
1954, pp. 35-50; COUNTRYMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, c. IV; BARRrr, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 45; ef. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1955, p. 1, col. 1, p. 8, col. 3; Aug. 17, 1955, p. 1, col. 1,
p. 15, cols. 1-3; Aug. 18, 1955, p. 1, col. 1, p. 14, cols. 3-7; Aug. 19, 1955, p. 1, col. 1, p. 6,
col. 2.
16. In driving "subversives" from critical jobs, committees have cooperated with other
investigating committees, THE STATES AND SUBVERSION 68-69 (Gellhorn ed. 1952), with
the F.B.I., BAurr, op. cit. supra note 1, at 27-29, with government employers, Govern-
ieut Printing Office Hearings, supra note 14, at 64, and with private employers, N.Y.
Times, July 14, 1955, p. 1, col. 3; CAsR, op. cit. supra note 1, at 257-58; Hearings on
Communist Infiltration in Defense Plants before the Permanent Subcommittee ol Investi-
gations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pp.
22-23 (1955).
Often the newspapers have cooperated, e.g., BARRrr, op. cit. supra note 1, at 280;
CARR, op. cit. supra note 1, at c. X, and when they have not, committees have sometimes
applied pressure to get cooperation, BARRET, op. cit. supra note 1, at c. XI. Cf. Editorial,
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sharing black lists 17 and informers 18 in the common task of singling out in-
dividuals for public scorn.19 Even more important than the development of
these new procedures has been the focus on a new sort of subject matter- the
politics of private citizens. Earlier generations of investigators concentrated
on government mismanagement; on the rare occasions when they made private
persons their target the victim was usually attacked for bribing government
officials.20 The new preoccupation with politics is of a different kind: not only
bribery but "un-American" politics of every sort has become subject to hostile
investigation ;21 and investigators of lobbying have apparently assumed that
everything in the political process is subject to probe.22
The committees' new activities have reawakened judicial concern-this time
because of the First Amendment. In the Rumely case,2 3 for example, Justice
N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1956, p. 32, col. 2 (charging persecution) ; TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST
80-81 (1955) (James Wechsler's charge of persecution).
17. The ubiquitous files of the House Un-American Activities Committee are described
in CARR, op. cit. supra note 1, at 253-61; COUNTRYMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 171; Hear-
ings on Charges and Countercharges involving Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens,
et al., before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on
Government Operations, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1921 (1954) (hereinafter cited as Army-
McCarthy Hearings). Senator Mundt, a former member of the House Committee, stated
that it had "five rooms of files on un-American activities." Ibid. Representative Thomas,
when chairman of the Committee, listed as one of his chief objectives "continued accumu-
lation of files and records to be placed at the disposal of the investigative units of the
Government and armed services." CARR, op. cit. supra note 1, at 37-38. See Black v.
Cutter Laboratories, 43 Cal. 2d 788, 795, 278 P.2d 905, 909 (1955) (discharge of private
employee partly based on information from files of California Un-American Activities
Committee) ; N.Y. Times, June 25, 1956, p. 1, col. 2 (black lists in entertainment indus-
try).
18. E.g., Government Printing Office Hearings, supra note 14, at 2-3; CouNTRYMAN,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 79-85 (J. B. Matthews) ; cf. N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1955, p. 38, col.
7 (letter protests Senate subcommittee's use of Paul Crouch) ; Aug. 19, 1955, p. 1, col. 1
(House committee hires Elizabeth Bentley as a consultant) ; July 14, 1955, p. 10, col. 2
(Winston Burdett).
19. Although the Supreme Court presumes investigations are not conducted for the
purpose of exposure, see note 4 supra, many committees frankly announce this as a purpose.
See, e.g., Arny-McCarthy Hearings, supra note 17, at 1928, 1950; BARRETT, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 339; TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST 76 (1955).
20. Landis, supra note 1, passim.
21. The House Un-American Activities Committee has investigated "the American
Civil Liberties Union, the C.I.O., the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the Farmer-
Labor party, the Federal Theatre Project, consumers' organizations, various publications
from the magazine 'Time' to the 'Daily Worker' .... ." United States v. Josephson, 165
F.2d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 1947) (dissenting opinion).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 54 (1953) (Buchanan Committee
of the House of Representatives); 102 CoNG. REc. 2702-03 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1956)
(Senate committee authorized to investigate "attempts to influence improperly or illegally
the Senate or any other member thereof, or any candidate therefor or any officer or em-
ployee of the Government, through campaign contributions, political activities, lobbying,
or any and all other activities and practices.").
23. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
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Frankfurter quoted Woodrow Wilson's famous defense of the "informing func-
tion of Congress, '24 but then observed:
"President Wilson did not write in the light of the history of events since
he wrote; more particularly he did not write of the investigative power
of Congress in the context of the First Amendment.
"[I] t cannot be denied that [a resolution giving] power to inquire into all
efforts of private individuals to influence public opinion through books and
periodicals, however remote the radiations of influence which they may
exert upon the ultimate legislative process, raises doubts of constitution-
ality in view of the prohibition of the First Amendment. '25
Troubled by the conflict between the First Amendment and committee prac-
tices, the courts have grown less willing to let the committees have their way,26
but to date they have not resolved the conflict. Judicial reaction to the First
Amendment problem has fallen into two patterns: confusion and avoidance.
The second of these is illustrated in the Rum ely case, a contempt prosecution
of a right-wing publisher who had refused on First Amendment grounds to
tell congressional investigators the identity of his subscribers. The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals agreed with the witness that Congress could not
constitutionally authorize questions about such matters,27 but to avoid deciding
the constitutional point the court construed the resolution authorizing the in-
vestigation narrowly, held that the question asked the witness was not perti-
nent, and reversed the conviction on statutory grounds.2 8  Hearing the case
24. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNIIENT 297, 303 (1885).
25. 345 U.S. at 44,46.
26. Since about 1950 the courts have found a variety of reasons for failing to convict
witnesses cited for contempt because they would not disclose the political activities of them-
selves or other people. E.g., Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219 (1955) (failure of com-
mittee to rule on witness' objections) ; Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955)
(self-incrimination) ; Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) (same) ; United States
v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (scope of resolution); United States v. Grossman, 229
F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (self-incrimination) ; Keeney v. United States, 218 F.2d 843
(D.C. Cir. 1954) (erroneous admission of evidence) ; United States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp.
791 (D. Mass. 1956) (pertinency); United States v. Deutch, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1955,
p. 12, col. 4 (D.D.C.) (pleadings); United States v. Dunham, 1 Civ. LiB. DocKc. § 340.3
(D.D.C. 1955) (self-incrimination); United States v. Metcalf, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1955,
p. 12, col. 6 (S.D. Ohio 1.955) (pleadings) ; United States v. Lamont, 18 F.R.D. 27 (S.D.
N.Y. 1955) (pleadings); United States v. Nelson, 103 F. Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1952) (self-
incrimination) ; United States v. Jaffe, 98 F. Supp. 191 (D.D.C. 1951) (same) ; United
States v. Raley, 96 F. Supp. 495 (D.D.C. 1951) (same); New Hampshire v. Uphaus, 116
A.2d 887 (N.H. 1955) (service of process). Compare note 5 supra.
A similar but less striking judicial reaction occurred when Congress tried to convict
witnesses for contempt because they failed to testify at the televised hearings of Senator
Kefauver's committee. E.g., United States v. Doto, 205 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1953) (self-in-
crimination); Bowers v. United States, 202 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (pertinency);
United States v. Kleinman, 107 F. Supp. 407 (D.D.C. 1952) (too much television) ; United
States v. Kamp, 102 F. Supp. 757 (D.D.C. 1952) (burden of proof not met).
27. Rumely v. United States, 197 F.2d 166, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
28. Id. at 174-78.
1956] 1163
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
on certiorari, the Supreme Court avoided the First Amendment issue in the
same way.29 In other cases as well the high Court has shunned the constitu-
tional point, 0 and several astute lower court judges have followed its example.31
Two federal courts of appeal have been less evasive, but their efforts have
left the First Amendment question in confusion. 32 The first attempt to hurdle
the constitutional barrier was the 1947 Second Circuit opinion in the Joseph-
son case, 33 affirming the contempt conviction of a private citizen who had re-
fused to testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee in order
to test the Committee's power to inquire about membership in the Communist
Party. The majority reasoned that as there was no First Amendment right to
secrecy about one's political affiliations, Congress could therefore impair such
secrecy constitutionally.34 The opinion suggested the Constitution did not
protect the timid, who alone would be deterred from free political action by the
Committee's activities,33 and that in any event the deterrent effect of expos6
was due to private action for which Congress was not responsible.30 The ma-
jority also refused to look behind the reasons stated in the Committee's au-
thorizing resolution to see if its actual purpose in calling the defendant was to
expose his political affiliations. 37
29. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1953). Justices Douglas and Black,
protesting that the re'solution could not be thus construed without doing violence to con-
gressional intent, concurred on First Amendment grounds. Id. at 48-58.
30. E.g., Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955) (decided on Fifth Amend-
ment grounds) ; Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (statutory construction);
Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 950 (1950) (cert. denied on this issue) ; United
States v. Barsky, 334 U.S. 843 (1948) (cert. denied), 339 U.S. 971 (1950) (rehearing
denied) ; United States v. Lawson, 339 U.S. 972 (1950) (cert. denied) ; United States v.
Marshall, 339 U.S. 933, 959 (1950) (cert. denied) ; United States v. Josephson, 333 U.S.
838 (cert. denied), 333 U.S. 858 (rehearing denied), 335 U.S. 899 (1948) (rehearing
denied).
31. E.g., United States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp. 791 (D. Mass. 1956) ; United States
v. Deutch, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1955, p. 12, col. 4 (D.D.C.); United States v. Metcalf,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1955, p. 12, col. 6 (S.D. Ohio); United States v. Lamont, 18 F.R.D.
27 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
32. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, a district court in the Ninth Circuit
has held that the First Amendment does not prevent committee questions about Communism.
United States v. Yukio Abe, 95 F. Supp. 991 (D. Hawaii 1950). In the First Circuit one
district court said the same in dictum. United States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp. 791 (D. Mass.
1.956). No other federal cases on the issue have been discovered.
The only state cases found on the point are Wyman v. Sweezy, 24 U.S.L. Week 2426,
2427 (N.H. Mar. 6, 1956) (the facts here may not be the same as in the usual federal case,
see note 50 infra) ; State v. James, 36 Wash. 2d 882, 221 P.2d 482 (1950). Cf. Nelson v.
Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 105 A.2d 756 (1954) (holding unclear); It re Coon, 44 Cal. App.
2d 531, 112 P.2d 767 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941).
33. United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 838,
rehearing denied, 333 U.S. 858, 335 U.S. 899, rehearing denied, 335 U.S. 899 (1948).
34. 165 F.2d at 92.
35. Ibid.
36. Id. at 89.
37. Ibid.
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A dissenting judge advocated a First Amendment limitation on the subject
matter that could be investigated: subjects on which no valid legislation was
possible should be immune from investigation.3 The majority's answer was
that it might be necessary to investigate a subject in order to determine whether
there was a clear and present danger justifying regulation.39 Moreover, they
said, investigation might be in aid of legislative functions other than that of
passing laws-for instance, appropriating funds.40 The court thus left the scope
of congressional inquiry virtually unrestricted by the First Amendment. 41
In the following year the District of Columbia Court of Appeals decided the
Barsky case.42 The facts and the result were substantially identical with those
of the Josephson decision,43 but the rationale was different. Where the Second
Circuit had concluded that there was no abridgment of First Amendment rights,
the District of Columbia Court found abridgment, 44 but excused it by reason-
ing similar to the clear and present danger test.45 Application of the test proved
tricky, however. The majority thought the "substantive evil" involved was
"Communists and Communism, '4 which they found presented the requisite
degree of danger. But the dissenting judge, who also invoked the clear and
present danger concept, concluded that the evil at which the congressional
activity was directed was "propaganda," which he thought too tame to justify
interference with constitutional freedoms. 47
38. Id. at 98 (Judge Clark). Cf. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 160-61 (1955).
39. 165 F.2d at 91.
40. Id. at 90.
41. See id. at 98 (dissenting opinion).
42. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843,
rehearing denied, 339 U.S. 971 (1948).
43. In Barsky the leaders of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee had wilfully
failed to produce records subpoenaed by the House Un-American Activities Committee.
They challenged the constitutionality of the resolution creating the committee on the ground
that it permitted asking a witness if be was "a believer in Communism or a member of the
Communist Party." 167 F.2d at 244. The court held the First Amendment objection un-
founded, and affirmed the conviction of the witnesses for contempt of Congress. Id. at 250,
252.
44. Id. at 249.
45. The majority said that restrictive legislation must be justified by a clear and
present danger, but restrictive inzestigation is justified "when danger is reasonably repre-
sented as potential." Id. at 247. In a later case the court seemed to equate its test with
the clear and present danger formula. Rumely v. United States, 197 F.2d 166, 174 (D.C.
Cir. 1952).
46. Judge Prettyman, who wrote the opinion in Barsky, explained it this way in the
later case of Rumely v. United States, 197 F.2d 166, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
47. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 258 (1948) (Judge Edgerton). Judge
Edgerton argued that the likely effect of investigating political propaganda was abridg-
ment of First Amendment freedoms in a fashion not justified by the clear and present
danger test. He also maintained that the resolution violated the First Amendment by virtue
of its purpose of restraining propaganda activities. Ibid. His proposal that judges scrutinize
the actual purpose of legislative investigators to determine the legality of their questions
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The Supreme Court denied certiorari in both Josephson and Barsky,48 leav-
ing the rationales in conflict. The cases were, however, still consistent in hold-
ing that legislative inquiries into ,Communist affiliations did not violate the First
Amendment and a number of subsequent cases have held similarly.49 This year,
however, the line between questions about "Communism" and about other poli-
tical activity has been challenged. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has
held that a state investigating committee may ask a "Socialist" state university
professor about his affiliations with the Progressive Party in 1948.0 In sum,
judicial awareness of First Amendment problems has not produced a clear line
of demarcation staking out the areas of prohibited inquiry into political activity.
pointed the opposite way from the Supreme Court's earlier decisions, see note 4 supra, and
the suggestion was not adopted by other courts.
In Watkins v. United States, 24 U.S.L. Week 2329 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 26, 1956) Judge
Edgerton reversed a conviction for contempt of the House Un-American Activities Com-
mittee, the opinion resting heavily on the notion that the purpose of the committee was
violative of the First Amendment. But on rehearing en banc the decision was overruled.
Watkins v. United States, 24 U.S.L. Week 2497 (D.C. Cir. April 23, 1956). Compare
United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956), decided before the Watkins case
was overruled (witness not guilty of perjury for giving false information to investigating
committee since question was asked for an improper purpose).
48. Review by the Supreme Court was denied three times in Josephson, twice in
Barsky. See notes 33,42 supra.
49. E.g., Watkins v. United States, 24 U.S.L. WEEx 2497 (D.C. Cir. April 23, 1956);
Marshall v. United States, 176 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 933
(1950) ; Morford v. United States, 176 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Lawson v. United States,
176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 934 (1950); United States v. Dennis,
171 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1,948), cert. granted on other issues, 337 U.S. 954 (1949), aff'd,
339 U.S. 162 (1950) ; Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. dis-
missed as mwot, 338 U.S. 883 (1949) ; United States v. Sacher, 139 F. Supp. 855 (D.D.C.
1956) ; United States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp. 791 (D. Mass. 1956) (dictum) ; United States
v. O'Connor, 135 F. Supp. 590 (D.D.C. 1955) ; United States v. Fitzpatrick, 96 F. Supp.
491 (D.D.C. 1.951) ; United States v. Yukio Abe, 95 F. Supp. 991 (D. Hawaii 1950) ; State
v. James, 36 Wash. 2d 882, 221 P.2d 482 (1950).
50. Wyman v. Sweezy, 24 U.S.L. Week 2426 (N.H. Mar. 6, 1956). It is not clear to
what extent this case is precedent for allowing a similar question asked by a federal com-
mittee. Unlike the federal practice which makes refusal to answer congressional commit-
tee questions a misdemeanor, 11 STAT. 155 (1857), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1952), the New Hamp-
shire procedure under which Sweezy was punished only makes refusal to answer commit-
tee questions contempt if the committee has obtained a court order compelling the recal-
citrant witness to answer the specific question, so that there is judicial review of the con-
stitutionality of the question before the witness refuses to reply. N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN.
§491:19 (1955).
It is not clear from the opinion or the trial record in the Sweezy case whether the
witness was given an opportunity by the committee to give his testimony in secret session
with a promise of its being kept confidential. Since no stress is put upon this factor in the
New Hampshire Supreme Court's opinion it seems dubious that the opportunity was
afforded. But in the earlier case of Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 45, 105 A.2d 756, 767
(1954), the same court appeared to require the same committee to confine its questioning
to executive session unless the witness desired publicity, and the court criticized the com-
mittee's practice of publishing executive session testimony of uncooperative witnesses.
1166 [Vol. 65:1159
INQUIRY INTO POLITICAL ACTIVITY
The courts' failure to state a clear First Amendment rule has had the same
practical consequences as if they had decided that the amendment does not
apply to legislative investigation. With the scope of the amendment beclouded
as it now is, no witness can safely invoke it as a ground for refusing to testify.51
And while the Supreme Court is silent on the issue, opponents of investigating
abuses cannot easily use the constitutional argument to curb them.52 Opposi-
tion is easily construed as a defense of the persons under investigation,5 3 for
professed vigilance for constitutional rights sounds false as long as the Supreme
Court itself refuses to call investigations unconstitutional.
But certain investigative activities do encroach on the area protected by the
Bill of Rights, and the courts have a duty to define that area and guard against
its infringement.0 4 To prove these points this Comment will examine the policy
of the First Amendment as revealed in its wording, the history of its adoption
and its past interpretation by the Supreme Court; it will show how legislative
investigations of private political beliefs and activities contravene the policy of
the amendment, and will suggest the manner in which the courts can and should
give effect to the amendment by setting limits on the committees' activities.
The varied interpretation that the Supreme Court has given the First Amend-
ment is such that any effort to reconcile all the holdings must ignore some of
the language in the opinions. The analysis presented here is not the strongest
statement of the First Amendment policy that the cases would support. Instead
51. For an example of witnesses invoking miscellaneous provisions in the Constitu-
tion in the hope that one of them would justify a refusal to answer questions about the
politics of private citizens, see N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1955, P. 6, cols. 7-8.
52. See Editorial, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1955, p. 22, col. 1.
53. See BARR=, THE TENmt CoMMIrrE 331 (1.951) ; CARR, THE HousE COMMIT-
TEE ON UN-AmERiCAN AcnvinEs 1945-1950, at 200 (1952); TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST
112, 117-23 (1955); Press Release of Seditious Activities Investigation (Broyles) Com-
mission of Illinois, p. 1, in cover of SPECIAL REPORT OF COMMIT=FE (1949) on file in Yale
Law Library. See note 16 supra, for examples of attacks by committees on hostile news-
papers.
54. When the original Constitution was before the state conventions for ratification
the anti-federalists opposed it for fear it would fast result in oligarchy. Their grudging
support for the -new scheme was won by the promise of a judge-enforced Bill of Rights
to preserve popular government. See 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 2-3, 4, 5, 8, 20-21,
25, 45-47 (Ford ed. 1895); BLOO-M, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION 280-82 (1.940); WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
SUPREME COuRT 77-83 (1935).
Indeed, the Federalist Papers had promised judicial review of the constitutionality of
legislation in order that the citizens might always be the masters of the Congress. THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 576-80 (Hamilton ed. 1880) (Hamilton). And Madison's speech
introducing the clauses which became the Bill of Rights declared that they would be en-
forced by judges. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 457 (1834). Whether or not the Founding
Fathers intended judicial review at the Constitutional Convention-and the debate of
scholars still goes on, see 2 CRossxEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 938-1046 (1953) ;
HART & WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTE 14-15 n.34 (1953)-
the price of anti-federalist ratification of the Constitution was a First Amendment enforced
by judges. WARREN, op. cit. supra at 85; 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 449, 463 (1834).
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it is a description, consistent with the Supreme Court holdings, of the minimum
protection that the constitutional provision affords.
THE POLICY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Protection of What
The words of the First Amendment suggest protection of three different
sorts of freedoms:
a) of religion-"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof";
b) of the communication of ideas---"or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press";
c) of private political activity---"or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
The reported debates of Congress in 1789 " dealt only with the first and last of
these freedoms.56 The words "freedom of speech, or of the press" were dealt
with as a facet of freedom of political activity.57 In later years, the Supreme
Court recognized the free speech and free press clauses as safeguards of non-
55. The debates in the House are presented in 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 440-68, 685-90,
730-809 (1834). There is no record of the debates in the Senate. BLOOM, HISTORY OF THE
FORMATION OF THE UNION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 313 (1940).
56. Madison originally proposed a series of new clauses to be inserted in Art. I, § 9 of
the Constitution, three of which formed the basis of the present First Amendment. His
phrasing suggested the modern concept of three types of freedoms. 1. ANNALS OF CONGRESS
451 (1834). When the Committee of Eleven reported out proposed amendments to the
House the three clauses had been rearranged to make two separate amendments--one
treating religion and the other dealing with speech, press, assembly and petition. 1 id. at
757, 759. The two proposals were debated and passed separately and were not combined
until they reached the Senate. 1 id. at 757-78; BLOOM, op. cit. supra note 55, at 308, 314.
In the debate on the amendment containing the speech, press, assembly and petition clauses
there was no discussion of the right to speak or publish on nonpolitical subjects; all atten-
tion was on the topic of popular control of the federal government. 1 ANNALS OF CON-
GRESS 759-78 (1834) ; BLOOM, op. cit. supra note 55, at 308-09. Representative Tucker's
motion to amend the proposal to include the right of people to bind their representatives
by instructions consumed most of the debate time. 1 ANNALS OF CoNGRESS 761-76 (1834).
The primarily political connotation of the amendment was illustrated in Representative
Sedwick's motion to omit mention of the right of assembly because it was self-evident that
freedom of speech included the right to assemble to petition the government. 1 id. at 759.
57. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. Art. 1, § 5 (1792), in 1 THORPE, AMERICAN CHARTERS,
CoNsTrruTIoNs, AND ORGANIC LAws 569 (1909) :
"The press shall be free to every citizen who undertakes to examine the official con-
duct of men acting in a public capacity; and any citizen may print on any subject,
being responsible for the abuse of that liberty."
PENN. CONsT. Art. IX, § 7 (1790), in 5 id. 3100:
"That the printing-presses shall be free to every person who undertakes to examine
the proceedings of the legislature, or any branch of government, and no law shall
ever be made to restrain the right thereof. ... In prosecutions for the publication
of papers investigating the official conduct of officers or men in a public capacity, or
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political communication,r s but preserved their original political stamp.59 This
Comment is chiefly concerned with the relation of congressional investigations
to the political segment of the First Amendment; cases bearing on the first two
freedoms will be examined only as they shed light on the third.60 This aspect,
as conceived by the amendment's sponsors and interpreted by the Supreme
Court, protects a broadly defined political process 61 embracing beliefs 62 and
where the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof may
be given in evidence...."
Vr. CoNsT. c. 1, § XV (1786), in 6 id. 3753:
"That the people have a right of freedom of speech and of writing and publishing
their sentiments, concerning the transactions of government-and therefor the free-
dom of the press ought not to be restrained."
See, generally, CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (1948) ; WHIPPLE,
OUR ANCIENT LiBERTIEs 91-99 (1927).
58. E.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (motion pictures);
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (comic books); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516,531 (1945) (soliciting union members).
59. E.g., United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 121 (1948) ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530 (1945) ; DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 363, 365 (1937) ; Grosjean v. Ameri-
can Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245-51 (1936); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 717-23
(1931) ; cf. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 n.18 (1952) ; Saia v. New York, 334
U.S. 558, 561 (1948).
60. In many contexts the three aspects have identical legal consequences, and the courts
find violations of the First Amendment without identifying any specific one. E.g., Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501, 503 (1952) ; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 164 (1944) ; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). But on occasion the
Court has distinguished the political aspect from the others to indicate that it should receive
greater judicial protection, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 n.18 (1952)
(dictum) ; Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561 (1948) (dictum) ; Minersville School
District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599 n.6 (1940) ; United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), or to illustrate the fact that the speech, press, assembly
and petition clauses fit together to make a single entity, e.g., United States v. CIO, 335
U.S. 106, 144 (1948) (concurring opinion) ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945);
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353,364-65 (1936).
61. E.g., 1 ANNALS OF CoNGREsS 450, 454, 766 (1834) (Madison's explanation of his
proposed amendments) ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) ; Board of Education
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640-44 (1943); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-05
(1940).
Although the policy of the amendment is protection of the political process as a whole,
the Supreme Court is authorized to vindicate that policy only when the issue is properly
before it in a case or controversy involving an individual litigant's rights. Adler v. Board
of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952) ; United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1946) ;
Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945). Where this Comment speaks of
"abridgment of the political process" it would be more precise, though not more informa-
tive, to speak of abridgment of the political rights of persons entitled to participate in that
process.
62. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ; cf. American Com-
munications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 406-11 (1950) (concedes political beliefs are
protected but finds the specific abridgment justified).
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their expression,13 and a wide range of activities directed toward influencing
the policy of government. 64
Protection From Whom
The prohibition of the First Amendment, in terms directed against "Con-
gress," has been interpreted to prohibit interference in the political process by
state governments as well.6 5 It is likely that it applies to any branch or agent
of either government, including legislative committees and subcommittees."6
The amendment does not, however, restrain private action.67 Thus if both
63. Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242
(1937); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) ; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359
(1931) ; cf. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) ; United States v. CIO, 335 U.S.
106 (1948).
64. E.g., DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (joining political groups); cf.
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) (lobbying) (dictum) ; Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 558 (1948) (use of candidates' sound trucks) (dictum) ; see also United States
v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 143-46 (1948) (publishing union newspaper) (concurring opinion).
Earlier cases suggested that some forms of participation in the political process were
not covered by the First Amendment. E.g., Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942) (com-
mercial book sale); Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915)
(motion pictures); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736 (1877) (use of the mails). But
later decisions appear to have extended the amendment's coverage to all aspects of the
process. E.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (motion pictures) ;
Jones v. Opelika (second opinion), 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (commercial book sale); cf.
Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 191 (1948) (use of the mails).
65. E.g., Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943) ; DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353 (1937) ; cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
66. It is clear that the Fourteenth Amendment as it applies the First Amendment to
state action forbids "abridgment" by other branches of state government as well as by the
legislatures. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) ; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). And the Fourteenth Amendment's
prohibition runs against delegated legislative power as well. Board of Education v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) ; cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
Federal committees might argue for a very literal construction of the word "Congress"
in the First Amendment which would require the abridgment to be caused by the action of
the whole Congress and not merely by a committee of one chamber. But such a construc-
tion would frustrate the purpose envisaged by the sponsors of the amendment, 1 ANNALS
OF CONGRESS 450, 454, 766 (1834), and would have no basis in policy or case law. In the
only Supreme Court case discussing the issue, the Court strongly worded its intention to
construe the amendment broadly, and expressly declared that the amendment applied to
the federal judiciary as well as to Congress. Bridges v. California, supra, at 260, 263.
One Justice has thought the amendment applicable to action by the federal executive.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 143 (1951) (concurring
opinion by Justice Black).
67. Cf. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1951) (conviction of de-
fendants for violation of a trespass-after-warning ordinance is not "state action" because
in giving warning the state is merely acting as the agent of private homeowners). But see
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 166-67 (1948) (dictum suggests that a
private monopoly of motion picture production might violate the First Amendment if it in-
volved restraint of what, if any, films the public will see) ; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501, 509 (1946) (suggests that enforcement of private corporation rules against free speech
may be government action where the corporation owns an entire town).
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governmental and private actions have combined to restrict political freedom,
the amendment applies to the governmental action only if it has been a sub-
stantial factor in producing the prohibited result. 8
Protection Against What
Government action in any form that interferes with or burdens freedom of
political belief or activity "abridges" in the constitutional sense. 69 Not only
criminal statutes 70 but taxation,71 licensing 72 and the denial of governmental
68. In American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), the Court held
that government action that would discourage union members from electing Communists
as labor leaders abridged the political rights of the union and the leaders, but that the
abridgment was constitutional. See text at notes 89-95 infra. The Court suggested that
the First Amendment would apply to government action that discouraged political effort
indirectly, giving as an example a government requirement that adherents of particular
political parties wear identifying arm bands. 339 U.S. at 402. In the example and in the
facts before the Court, abridgment was the result of concurrent action by both the govern-
ment and private individuals. If private observers did not shun the people with arm bands,
and if union members did not reject Communist leaders because of the loss of NLRB privi-
leges, there would be no restriction of political freedom.
This seems to be the rationale of United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954), and
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953), where congressional efforts to compel and
publicize answers about indirect lobbying were frustrated by the Court. Both decisions
were nominally made on grounds of statutory construction, but the Court made it clear
that its harshly restrictive construction was necessary to avoid First Amendment problems.
347 U.S. at 626; 345 U.S. at 47-48. If the First Amendment does not apply to restrictions
of political freedom caused by public reactions to government publication of information
obtained by compulsion, these strained constructions were unnecessary. And see Quinn v.
United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955) (implies First Amendment limits the scope of
legislative investigating committees). Cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952).
The case law in this area is too undeveloped to indicate the line between government
stimulation of private action which is sufficiently "substantial" to invoke the First Amend-
ment, and that which is not. But at least where testimonial compulsion by Congress is
necessary to produce the resulting abridgment, the cases cited above indicate that the
government's role is sufficient.
69. Early holdings of the Court limiting "abridgment" to the notion of "prior re-
straints" or to the common law of 1791 were superseded by Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 248-49 (1936) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1941). See
CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 9-31 (1948).
70. E.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S.
583 (1943) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
Criminal punishment may also lurk in the background of other types of abridgment.
E.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (punishment not for speech, but for failing
to get a license before speaking) ; Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629 (1943)
(punishment of parents who do not send children to school, coupled with denial of free
schools to children who do not salute the flag) ; American Communication Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382 (1950) (punishment of union leaders who falsely swear they do not believe
in the use of violence, coupled with denial of NLRB services to unions whose officers have
not so sworn).
71. E.g., Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) ; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
72. E.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Kunz v. New York,
340 U.S. 290 (1951) ; Schneider v. State, 30S U.S. 147 (1939).
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benefits 73 have been deemed to "abridge." Nor is a formal "law" necessary
so long as the cause of the restraint is official action.74
Protection to What Degree
But not every "abridgment" of the political process falls before the First
Amendment: the Constitution does not provide immunity from restriction, but
only requires that abridgments meet two special tests of constitutionality3. T
First, the government may never curtail First Amendment freedoms at all
unless some substantial public interest requires it, and even then it must use
the least restrictive means compatible with its goal. This may be called the
policy of least abridgment. The second requirement is that in imposing abridg-
ments, the government may not discriminate in certain ways.
73. Government employment may be a privilege, not a right, Bailey v. Richardson, 182
F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951), but
denials of the privilege can abridge First Amendment freedoms, e.g., Wieman v. Upde-
graff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952). Cf. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 492
(1952) (dictum); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94 (1947) (dictum).
Similarly, an alien's continued residence in the country is a privilege rather than a
right, Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586-87 (1952), but discriminatory deporta-
tions would be abridgments. Cf. Kwong Hai Chew v. Gelding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953)
(dictum) ; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, supra at 591-92 (dictum).
Discrimination in affording the services of the NLRB may also be an abridgment.
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 393 (1950) (dictum).
Early cases proceeded on the theory that discrimination in granting mailing privileges
was not an abridgment, e.g., Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877) ; Lewis Publishing Co.
v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 304 (1913) (semble) ; but later decisions appear to concede that
this is an abridgment that must pass First Amendment requirements, e.g., Donaldson v.
Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 191. (1948) ; Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 407 (1921). Cf. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1945). In the light
of the later decision in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, supra, these cases would
probably be treated today as examples of abridgment of freedom of communication, only
justified because the test of the amendment was met.
The use of public parks and streets as a locale for public speaking is a form of govern-
ment subsidy but discriminatory denial of the benefit has frequently been held an abridg-
ment. E.g., Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) ; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939) ; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
For a definition of "discrimination" as used in this footnote, see text at notes 83-99
supra.
74. Although no Supreme Court decision squarely holds that the word "law" in the
First Amendment embraces nonstatutory action by the federal government there is dictum
to that effect in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260, 263 (1941), and in several cases
the First Amendment, as incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment, was held to prohibit
action taken by state judges although no statute was involved. E.g., Craig v. Harney, 331
U.S. 367 (1.947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California,
supra.
75. In this Comment the term "abridgment" is used to describe any government action
that has the effect of restricting political effort whether constitutional or not. The Supreme
Court has not always used this terminology, but has sometimes reserved the term "abridg-
ment" for actions that not only restrict freedoms but also fail to pass the constitutional
tests. E.g., Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 645 (1951).
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The Policy of Least Abridgment
The policy against unnecessary governmental restriction of First Amend-
ment rights requires the courts to strike down restrictions unless they meet
two requirements: they must be imposed for some substantial public purpose,76
and must be necessary for the purpose.77 To enforce this policy the courts first
assay the goal of a given legislative action, and then determine whether means
less harmful to First Amendment rights might be used to reach it.73 The courts
76. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (keeping streets free from littering is not
a substantial purpose) ; cf. Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (same) ; Lovell v. Grif-
fin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (same). See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508-09
(1951), where the Court stated that the lack of a substantial purpose for imposing abridg-
ment was the explanation of the earlier decisions in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940) (purpose to protect the public from fraud and crime by door-to-door peddlers),
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (purpose to protect house-holders' quiet
and privacy), Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (purpose to promote
loyalty to the government), Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (purpose to protect
workers from fraudulent solicitations), Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1945) (purpose
to preserve owner's exclusive use of private property) ; cf. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268, 273-82 (1951) (concurring opinion) (same; also suggests that raising funds for
community purposes is not a substantial purpose).
77. See cases cited in note 78 infra. The rule against vague regulations of First
Amendment freedom, e.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) ; Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), is a
corollary of the same principle. The infirmity of vague regulations is that persons have
no way of knowing whether their actions are prohibited. As a result they refrain from
activity the legislature did not intend to cover rather than run the risk of prosecution. See
United States v. Harriss, supra at 626; United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 153 (1948).
Similarly, the requirement that persons denied government employment on the basis of
their affiliation with groups advocating political violence must have known this to be the
group's purpose stems from the policy against unnecessary abridgments: a blanket denial
to all members, innocent or not, is not required to preserve the integrity of the public ser-
vice. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) ; Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S.
485,492 (1952) (dictum).
78. Thus, in invalidating a state statute as an unnecessarily restrictive means to a valid
goal, the Court has often suggested a permissible alternative to the legislature. E.g., Wie-
man v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190 (1952) (legislature should have required scienter) ;
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-95 (1951) (legislature should have set up standards
for grant of license) ; Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560 (1948) (legislature should have
specified hours when loudspeakers were forbidden and sound level forbidden) ; Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943) (legislature should have used trespass-after-
warning statute) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1940) (legislature should
draft criminal law more specifically to restrict less activity) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 100 (1940) (same) ; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (legislature
should outlaw littering the streets, not distribution of handbills) ; Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697, 712-23 (1931) (legislature should use subsequent, not prior, restraints).
The Supreme Court has not made similar suggestions to Congress, but has sometimes
virtually rewritten federal legislation to avoid unconstitutionality. E.g., United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) ; Rumely v. United States, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) ; United States
v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
Even when a statute is upheld as written, the Court usually indicates in its opinion that
the restriction is as narrow as could be used to accomplish the purpose. E.g., Adler v.
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have used several verbal formulas in deciding whether restrictions were neces-
sary.79 Sometimes the clear and present danger test has been used to sum-
marize this general policy, 0 although its original function was the narrower
one of determining when speech was so likely to cause dangerous action that
the speech as well as the action might be outlawed.81 The Supreme Court case
law is, however, more accurately summarized by this formula: even if the end
is proper, Congress cannot pursue it by means that abridge First Amendment
Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 490 (1952) ; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
505-11 (1951) ; American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 405-06 (1950).
Sometimes the Court has struck down a state statute without indicating permissible
means to accomplish the same goal. E.g., Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) ; Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943) ; DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937). The opinions in these cases suggest that some legislative goals are completely
barred by the First Amendment.
Choice of a particular means that abridges political freedom may often be justified where
there is no less restrictive alternative that would accomplish the goal almost as well. E.g.,
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625-26 (1954) (misrepresentative lobbying) ; Adler
v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 489-90 (1952) (propaganda in schools too subtle to
prevent except by screening political beliefs and affiliations of teachers) ; Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 510-11 (1951) (attempted revolution geared to foreign aggression).
79. There has been great disagreement among the Justices as to the proper formula for
reviewing state restrictions of First Amendment freedoms. Justice Frankfurter has argued
for the same formula as is applied to state restrictions of economic freedom; Justices Black
and Douglas have argued that the greater specificity of the First Amendment demands a
different and stricter standard of judicial review. See, e.g., Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345
U.S. 67, 70 (1953) (majority and concurring opinions) ; Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250, 262, 268-70 (1952) (majority and dissenting opinions) ; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77, 89-97, 98-104 (1949) (concurring and dissenting opinion); FPC v. Natural Gas Pipe-
line Co., 315 U.S. 575, 600 n.4 (1942) (concurring opinion).
80. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 507-11 (1951) ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 527 n.12, 530 (1945) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940).
81. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Compare American Communi-
cations Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 396 (1950) (refusing to apply the test) ; Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 670-71 (1925) (same). The test was fashioned to determine the
constitutionality of a statute that made speech criminal because of the tendency of such
speech to cause harmful action by the audience; the test was "whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."
Schenck v. United States, supra at 52.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has tried to use the clear and present danger
test to determine which questions an investigating committee witness may be compelled to
answer despite the First Amendment. See text at notes 42-47 supra. But the test is in-
appropriate in- that context. The "substantive evil" in the Schenck case was obstruction
of recruiting. It had been identified by the legislature when the statute was passed. The
"substantive evil" in a prosecution of a contumacious committee witness is not analogous.
Not all committees are hostile, and the authorizing resolution of a friendly committee may
not contemplate a "substantive evil." Even where the investigation is hostile, the resolu-
tion is often so vague that it is difficult to tell the specific evil at which it is directed. In
the Barsky case, for example, the "evil" might have been identified as "Congressional
ignorance"; "Communism"; "propaganda" ; "disloyalty"; "attempts at revolution at home";
"Soviet aggression"; etc. See text at notes 46-47 supra. See, generally, Congressional
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freedoms if the end could be substantially achieved without unreasonable diffi-
culty by means that Nvould abridge such freedom less.
The Policy Against Discriminatory Abridgments
All abridgments of the political process are discriminatory in the broad sense
that they encourage some kinds of political effort and discourage others; the
critical inquiry for this aspect of the amendment is the basis of discrimination. 2
By and large, as long as the least abridgment test is met, the legislature may
make such distinctions as it wishes. For example, it may make distinctions
based on the time, place or manner in which persons participate in the political
process, 3 or based on the classes of persons qualified to participate.8 4 But the
Investigations and First Amendntent Restrictions on the Compudsion of Testimony, 29
IND. L.J. 162, 169-72 (1954).
Moreover, use of the clear and present danger formula in this context blinds a court to
the possibility of alternative legislative procedures which could accomplish the legislative
goal equally well without unnecessary restrictions on political freedom.
82. In addition, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment probably
applies to federal action through the Fifth Amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954). Cases have sometimes been vague as to whether the First Amendment nondis-
crimination test or an Equal Protection Clause test were at issue. E.g., Niemotko v. Mary-
land, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951). See also cases referring to "arbitrary" abridgments of
political freedom: e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952); American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 393, 405 (1950) (dictum) ; United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1946) (dictum). But discrimination may violate
both the First Amendment test and the Equal Protection Clause. Fowler v. Rhode Island,
345 U.S. 67 (1953).
The two major differences between the First Amendment nondiscrimination policy and
the Equal Protection Clause seem to be: (1) the First Amendment is only concerned with
discrimination against political candidates and platforms, ideas, and religion, while the
other clause applies to all subjects; (2) the First Amendment flatly bans certain types of
discrimination without regard to their "reasonableness," e.g., United Public Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1946) (dictum) whereas the Equal Protection Clause involves
consideration of the reasonableness of the categories created by the legislature, e.g., Tigner
v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940). However, when discrimination is based on race the Equal
Protection Clause may also operate automatically. Cf. Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94, 100 (1946)
(dictum).
83. Time: Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 298
(1941) (injunction of picketing for limited time is constitutional); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (prohibition of incitement to resist draft during wartime is
constitutional) ; cf. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 269 (1941) (indefinite bar on dis-
cussion is unconstitutional).
Place: Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951) (ban on door-to-door
peddling of literature after warning is constitutional) ; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85
(1949) (ban on sound trucks in certain areas is constitutional) ; Milk Wagon Drivers
Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, supra at 298 (ban on picketing near dairies is constitu-
tional) ; cf. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (ban on all door-to-door
peddling of literature is unconstitutional). Suggestions in earlier cases that the exercise
of First Amendment freedoms in public parks and streets was immune from regulation,
e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162-63 (1939) (streets) ; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
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legislature cannot discriminate against a candidate urged for office or a policy
advocated for government adoption. 5 In regulating the form of the democratic
process the legislature can go as far as the least abridgment test permits in
scotching not only undesirable methods of politicking, but even the teaching of
them 86 or the belief in them.87 In every case, however, the court must decide
whether the legislative prescription touches upon the substance rather than the
form of political activity: the persons affected may not be singled out because
they believe in, teach or strive for one particular candidate or government
policy rather than another.88
496, 515 (1939) (parks), have been replaced by later decisions allowing such regulation
as long as there is no unnecessary or discriminatory abridgment, e.g., Poulos v. New
Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 403 (1.953) (parks); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574-
78 (1941) (streets).
Manner: United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) (professional direct lobby-
ing); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (force and violence); Hughes v.
Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1950) (picketing) ; American Communications Ass'n
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 390 (1950) (political strikes); Kovacs v. Cooper, supra (loud
sound trucks) ; Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178, 184 (1946) (paying
newspaper employees less than minimum wage) ; NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190
(1943) (radio broadcasting without a license) ; Associated Press v. NLRB, 301. U.S. 103
(1937) (firing editors for union affiliation) ; Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255
U.S. 407 (1921) (inciting to crime).
84. Classes of persons discriminated against have long included people without property
holdings, children, women (until the Nineteenth Amendment), aliens, nonresidents and
persons who had not paid their poll taxes. See, generally, EMERsoN & HABER, POLITICAL
& CIvIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATEs 249-50 (1952). However, there is no requirement
that discrimination be based solely on the competency of individuals to make an intelligent
political choice. E.g., United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1946) (government
employees) ; Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937) (person who did not pay poll tax) ;
cf. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 171 (1948) (aliens in wartime). Classes of persons
with more power may be singled out for more extensive regulation. E.g., United States
v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) (professional direct lobbyists) ; American Communica-
tions Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 405 (1950) (union leaders); NLRB v. Virginia Power
Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941) (employers).
85. E.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 592 (1952) (dictum); American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 405 (1950) (dictum) ; Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 96-97 (1949) (concurring opinion); id. at 102 (dissent); United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1946) (dictum); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S.
190, 226 (1943) (dictum) ; cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952) ; Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 556 (1951.) (concurring opinion) ; American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, mtpra at 419 (concurring opinion) ; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1938) ;
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 130-33 (1937). The cases cited in note 60 supra,
that speak of a preferred position for the political freedom accorded by the First Amend-
ment seem to have this policy in view; and this policy is the heart of the popular control
over legislators which the First Amendment was intended to secure. 1 ANNALS OF CON-
GRESS 759-78 (1834).
86. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (conspiracy to teach violent revolu-
tion) ; cf. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (knowing affiliation with a
group teaching violent revolution).
87. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (belief in the use
of force or illegal means for political ends). See text at notes 89-97 infra.
88. Occasionally, discrimination based on political procedures may have an incidental
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The Douds case illustrates these principles.8 9 In that case the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute denying the services of the
National Labor Relations Board to any union whose officers failed to swear
that they did not belong to the Communist Party and did not believe in the use
of force for political ends." The Court, finding that the statute did abridge the
political process, 91 and that it passed the least abridgment test,92 decided that
it did not involve a forbidden type of discrimination. 3 The statute made a
critical distinction between persons who believed in the use of force and vio-
lence to achieve political ends and those who did not: the belief proscribed was
one about use of a political procedure, not a belief about candidates or goals
of government.94 The most difficult distinction was that drawn between mem-
bers of the Communist Party and all other persons. Since the Party supports
candidates and policies for government, this appeared to be discrimination of
the prohibited sort. Chief Justice Vinson handled the problem by finding that
members of the Communist Party were pledged to improper political methods. 95
By this rationale the discrimination became one based on the Party's threatened
use of force and violence, rather than its candidates or platform.96
Subsequent Supreme Court cases allowing Congress to discriminate between
the Communist Party and other political parties have rested on the same foun-
dation: that the Communist Party differs from other political groups in the
procedure it is committed to use to bring about adoption of its program and
discriminatory effect on substance. Such incidental discriminatory effects are unconstitu-
tional unless necessary for the accomplishment of a proper legislative purpose. Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) ; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 114
(1943) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940) ; cf. Lincoln Union v. Northwestern
Co., 335 U.S. 525, 530 (1949).
Cases involving such indirect discrimination against advocacy of particular programs
for government are the most difficult for the Court. See the Douds case, discussed in text
at notes 89-95 infra (discrimination against persons connected with the Communist Party);
MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948) (minority party trying to get on the ballot);
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948) (restriction on union campaign expenditures);
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (urban voters protesting pro-rural gerrymander).
89. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
90. 61 STAr. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (1952).
91. 339 U.S. at 393.
92. Id. at 400-02.
93. Id. at 403, 405, 407-11.
94. Id. at 406-12.
95. Id. at 407-08. Justice Jackson, concurring, elaborated on the difference between the
methods used by the Communist Party and the methods of other groups. Id. at 423-35.
96. The Court also examined two other types of discrimination in the statute: the dis-
tinction made between union leaders and other persons, and the distinction between poli-
tical strikes and other methods of political effort. The first was upheld by the Court on
the theory that it was not based upon the candidates or policies supported by union leaders
but upon the special power they wielded to interrupt interstate commerce through strikes.
Id. at 403-04. The second was upheld on the theory that Congress could if it wished out-
law strikes in interstate commerce as an improper means of political expression. Id. at
397-403.
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candidates.9 7 Other cases since Douds have made clear that in imposing re-
straints on the political process, Congress may not discriminate between per-
sons who support one political party rather than another so long as both parties
are willing to use lawful procedures.98
In sum, the First Amendment is called into play whenever political belief or
action is restricted in any manner by any governmental agency; it forbids such
restrictions when they are not necessary to effect a substantial policy, or when
they discriminate among candidates or among policies being urged for govern-
ment adoption.99 It remains to show how the activities of legislative investi-
97. E.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 592 (1952); Adler v. Board of
Education, 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) ; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510-11 (1951).
98. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 592 (1952). In several other cases the
Court has invalidated government discrimination against political groups or persons vague-
ly associated with them, on the ground that the discrimination is "arbitrary," without mak-
ing clear whether the constitutional ground was substantive due process, equal protection,
or the First Amendment nondiscrimination policy. E.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183, 191-92 (1952) ; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951).
99. The tests apply to the other two aspects of the amendment as well as the political
one. The least abridgment test, for example, with its requirement that restrictions be no
broader than -necessary, see text at notes 77-79 supra, has been applied to invalidate statutes
abridging communication of ideas, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952)
(vague) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940) (overly broad) ; Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (inappropriate type of tax), and statutes restrict-
ing the exercise of religious freedom, Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
The nondiscrimination test, see text at notes 82-88 supra, also reaches the nonpolitical;
but here the test has been applied somewhat differently. Because the relationship of the
government to religion is complicated by the additional requirement that "Congress shall
make no law . . . respecting the establishment of religion," the nondiscrimination policy
as applied to religious matters is exceedingly difficult. Not only discrimination betveen
sects is forbidden, Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951), but discrimination against
all religion is equally bad, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (dictum).
Moreover, discrimination in favor of all religion may be bad as an "establishment." Ibid;
ef. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 130, 139-40 (1943) (dissents argue tax exemp-
tion for religious colporteurs is an "establishment"). No comparable prohibition against
government establishment of politics or the communication of ideas appears in the amend-
ment or the case law. E.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1945)
(government may bring antitrust suit to promote the communication of ideas).
The nondiscrimination test has frequently been applied to the communication of ideas.
Discriminations based on the speaker's time, place, mode of expression or his identity have
been upheld with little difficulty. E.g., Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies,
312 U.S. 287, 296, 298 (1941) (time: enjoin peaceful picketing only while overtones of
past violence cling to it) ; Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951) (place:
householders' front doors) ; Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1950) (mwde:
picketing) ; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (identity: children).
Discrimination against specific ideas, on the other hand, is generally unconstitutional,
e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294 (1951) ; Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561-
62 (1948); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943), but four exceptions have been
recognized: ideas that are libelous, obscene or profane may be singled out for restriction,
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), and ideas that are too dangerously likely to
result in "substantive evils which Congress has a right to prevent" may also be discrimi-
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gating committees run into the prohibitions of the First Amendment; and then
to examine what the courts can and should do about it.
THE COMMITTEES AND THE AMENDMENT
A hypothetical example of clearly unconstitutional investigation will illustrate
the foregoing analysis of the First Amendment. A congressional committee is
authorized to investigate political behavior to determine whether the minimum
age for voting should be raised. The authorizing resolution has stated that the
present law fosters un-American voting, and the committee has promised to
reveal the names of young citizens who have unpatriotic voting records. The
committee hearing is public, covered by press, radio and television. Witness A,
whose name has been mentioned by prior witnesses, is subpoenaed to the hear-
ing and asked to reveal how he voted in the last election. He refuses to answer
until the committee chairman informs him that he will be prosecuted for con-
tempt if he does not cooperate. Under fear of prosecution he tells the commit-
tee that he voted for the Communist Party. His reply receives wide news
coverage; his name is placed on the committee's black list and on the lists of
other similar groups. His friends, business associates and employer learn of
his political preferences, and the committee suggests that they take appropriate
action.
Whether the committee's compelling Witness A to answer has violated the
First Amendment depends on two questions: has the committee's action
abridged the political process?; and if so, does the abridgment meet the tests
of the First Amendment?
Abridgment of the Political Process
In addition to its impact on Witness A, the committee's action has serious
effect on the minds of the radio listeners and newspaper readers who learned
of Witness A's experience. Many of them comprehend that if those aspects of
their voting record which they do not wish publicized were spread across the
headlines, they could be seriously embarrassed in their social and economic
dealings. Although few voted for the Communists, many have cast a ballot for
an unpopular candidate or party at some time in the past. People who never
voted in ways that would embarrass them realize now that they must vote with
an eye to the possibility of public examination by an investigating committee.
The result of the committee's action is to deter many of these people from
lawful political activity in which they would otherwise have engaged. They
know that they will run much less risk of expos6 and embarrassment if they
nated against, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (dictum). The ideas
prohibited under the latter test may create a likelihood of various harmful audience re-
actions that the legislature could ban, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)
(attempts at revolution) ; Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (riot) ; Giboney v.
Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (violation of antitrust law) ; Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (assault).
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confine their political activity to those orthodox means and goals which are
least likely to attract committee attention and, which, if revealed, would cause
the minimum public hostility. By compelling Witness A to answer questions
about his past voting, the committee has deterred other people from casting
their ballots freely in the future, and has thus abridged the political process. 100
The First Amendment is, therefore, brought into play; the committee's action
must be tested against the twin criteria of least abridgment and nondiscrimina-
tion.
The Least Abridgment Test
To meet the standards of the First Amendment, a restriction must be justi-
fied by a substantial legislative purpose. Two objectives can be suggested for
committee action of the sort under discussion :101 getting facts for legislation
and informing the public about political behavior.10 2
100. In similar First Amendment cases where the argument has been made, the Court
has examined the deterrent effect on other persons of abridgment of a particular defendant's
activity. E.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 626 (1954) (as narrowly construed,
the statute does not deter too many people) ; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191
(1952) (deterrence of observers is one reason statute is unconstitutional) ; Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951) (as narrowly construed the statute does not deter too
many people); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 393, 402-05
(1950) (nondiscriminatory, necessary restriction on affiliation of union officers as by-product
of regulation of union is constitutional) ; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143
(1.943) (restriction of speaker's freedom unconstitutionally restricts audience's right to
hear) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (same) ; United States v. Rumely,
345 U.S. 41, 57 (1953) (concurring opinion) (deterrence of observers is unconstitutional) ;
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 153 (1948) (concurring opinion) (restriction on union
newspaper publishing is unconstitutional restriction of right of readers to get information).
101. Federal investigating committees are limited in scope by the Necessary and
Proper Clause of the Constitution and the concept of separation of powers. In Kilbourn
v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880), a Senate investigation into the affairs of a real estate
pool that owed money to a bankrupt debtor of the United States was declared unconstitu-
tional for failure to meet these requirements. No subsequent Supreme Court case has
invalidated an investigation because its purpose was improper, but the Court has specifically
approved only three purposes for investigations: legislation, McGrain v. Daugherty, 273
U.S. 135, 178 (1927) ; supervising the public domain, Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S.
263, 294 (1-929) ; and determining the validity of elections of Congressmen, United States
v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 573 (1937). Lower courts have permitted investigation for other
purposes as well, e.g., Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (dictum)
(preserve government, propose constitutional amendments) ; United States v. Josephson,
165 F.2d 82, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1947) (dictum) (appropriating funds; exposure of political
beliefs) (semble).
102. A third possible reason for the committee's behavior might be to punish Witness
A for voting for Communists. Such a questionable purpose should not be imputed to the
committee unless its resolution proclaimed it. See note 4 suprar and accompanying text.
If Congress had set out to punish Witness A in this manner the committee action
would violate the least abridgment test. Punishing people for their past voting records
could -not be upheld as a "substantial" purpose that justified abridgment of political free-
dom. See note 76 supra and accompanying text. In addition efforts to punish in this manner
would meet obstacles in the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments, the prohibition against
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Fact-Finding
Fact-finding for legislation is a substantial purpose, 10 3 but since another
method less violative of the political process could have accomplished the same
purpose, the committee's method is unjustified. The information Witness A
had to give to the committee could have been secured without publicity, and
without identifying the witness. If the question had been asked in secret session
and the answer kept confidential by the committee, information would have been
gathered equally well, without extra cost or inconvenience, and without deterr-
ing any readers or onlookers. Insofar as the committee had to publish its find-
ings to other members of Congress this could have been done without identify-
ing the witness whose political activities or preferences had been revealed. With-
out such identification there would be no private sanctions against individuals,
and consequently less deterrence of observers, even though the inconvenience
and embarrassment to the individual subpoenaed would remain.
Informing the Pnblic
Another legislative object may be postulated-that of informing the electorate
about young voters' political behavior. Whether this meets First Amendment
criteria should be distinguished from a similar question-whether under the
"necessary and proper" clause Congress may compel testimony on any topic for
purposes other than that of legislation. Supreme Court dicta have suggested
that legislative powers of testimonial compulsion are narrowly restricted and
that they may not be exercised merely to inform the public.10 4 Yet there are
distinguished proponents of the "informing function of Congress,"'1° and if the
Court were forced to pass directly upon the issue, it might hold that in some
ex post facto laws and bills of attainder, and would probably be bad as a legislative en-
croachment on the judicial function. See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 69-74 (D.C.
Cir. 1950) (dissent), aff'd by an evenly divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). See also
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
103. See United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 573 (1.937) ; McGrain v. Daugherty,
273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927) ; Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 160 (1955) (dictum).
104. The Supreme Court has never specifically approved the use of the legislative
investigating power for the purpose of educating the electorate. See note 102 supra. In the
Rmnely case Justice Frankfurter appeared to recognize the validity of investigations for
the purpose of performing the "informing function of Congress," United States v. Rumely,
345 U.S. 41, 43 (1953), but it is not clear whether he meant informing the electorate or
informing the Congress. See id. at 46. And he suggested that the validity of investigations
for this purpose ended where the First Amendment's policy began. Id. at 44-46. See text
at note 25 supra.
An official agency propagandizing the electorate on the subject of private politics poses
obvious dangers to popular control of government, since its mere statements may have a
coiercive effect. Cf. Matter of Standard-Coosa-Thatcher, 85 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1949) (em-
ployer interrogation of employees about union affiliation is an unfair practice, interfering
with self-organization, and is not an example of employer's protected free speech). See
also United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 47, 57 (1953) (concurring opinion).
105. E.g., WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 297, 303 (1885) ; CARR, THE HOUSE
COMMITTrEE ON UN-AmERICAN AcmiviTiEs 1945-1950, at 7 (1952).
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circumstances the legislature can force witnesses to give information for that
purpose alone.
Even if this goal is sufficient under the "necessary and proper" clause to
justify testimonial compulsion generally, the additional question remains whether
it is a "substantial" enough governmental purpose to justify questions about
First Amendment subject matter. The process entails a balancing of interests
and needs, but, as suggested in the Rumely and Quinn cases, the necessity of
preserving political freedom might outweigh the benefits of additional public
information.
A third factor dictating against the constitutionality of the question asked
Witness A is that less restrictive alternatives could accomplish substantially the
same objective. Public interrogation of witnesses is undoubtedly helpful in
drawing and keeping public attention. Nevertheless, by using imaginative radio
and television techniques dramatizing the results of their inquiry, the commit-
tees could still get their messages across to the public without identifying the
politics of individuals. A court might well find such alternative techniques
feasible enough to condemn open-session interrogation as "unnecessary" for
educating the voters.
The Discrimination Test
Even if it got by the least abridgment test, the action of the committee in the
hypothetical example would be unconstitutional under the other aspect of the
First Amendment-the ban on discrimination against individuals' political
efforts on the basis of the programs they seek for government adoption. The
Supreme Court has often invoked the discrimination test to strike down regu-
latory schemes that gave officials too much discretion to permit or deny the
exercise of First Amendment rights. 1 6 These regulatory plans showed no dis-
criminatory purpose on their face, but were unconstitutional because they were
too susceptible to discriminatory application. Even when there was no proof
that the system had been abused to the harm of the particular litigant, the
Court has invalidated a statute affecting him because of the likelihood that
abuse would occur on another occasion. 107
For the same reasons the resolution establishing the committee that ques-
tioned Witness A is unconstitutional as unreasonably susceptible to discrimi-
natory application. Under the resolution, the committee is given almost un-
fettered discretion in selecting witnesses and the questions to be asked them.
Such discrimination has already marked the history of legislative investiga-
tions: vague authorizing resolutions 108 have allowed the members of a com-
106. Eg., Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951) ; Saia v. New York, 334
U.S. 558, 560-61 (1948) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) ; Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147,164 (1939).
107. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558
(1948).
108. E.g., The House Un-American Activities Committee "is authorized to make from
time to time investigations of (i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propa-
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mittee or its staff to select individuals of one political stripe for public humilia-
tion while ignoring individuals of other persuasions who were otherwise equally
eligible for investigation.'0 9
But the Court would not need to measure the likelihood of committee abuses
in order to strike down on its face a resolution which authorized publicized
compulsory interrogation about politics; even if a committee did not discrimi-
nate in choosing the targets of investigation discrimination would inevitably
result from popular reactions. Witnesses who are forced to reveal unorthodox
political ties meet more hostility than those who reluctantly reveal themselves
to be Republicans or Democrats. As long as committees investigate and publish
the political preferences of identified individuals the result will be pressure on
citizens to drop unorthodox programs in favor of more conventional ones. The
conclusion must follow that any resolution authorizing public investigation of
political matters is so likely to have this improper discriminatory effect that it
violates the First Amendment on its face.
To state the rule of Witness A's case more generally, both aspects of the
First Amendment are violated whenever an investigating committee compels
a witness to give publicized testimony about private political activities. It re-
mains to be seen how the courts can draw this constitutional line, and how large
an area it should circumscribe.
PROBLEMS OF APPLICATION AND SCOPE
The Limits of Judicial Protection
Although there would be a First Amendment abridgment on any occasion
when a committee focused hostile public opinion on an individual's political
activity, the judiciary would not always be able to give protection or redress. 0
In practice, the question would only come before the courts in a contempt prose-
cution brought against a witness who refused to testify."' In such a case, if
ganda activities in the United States ... ."; the word "un-American" is nowhere defined.
Act of Aug. 2, 1946, c. 753, § 121(b) (1) (8) (2), 60 STAT. 828. The Senate has recently
authorized a special committee "to investigate the subject of attempts to influence improper-
ly or illegally the Senate or any member thereof, or any candidate therefor, or any officer
or employee of the Government, through campaign contributions, political activities, lobby-
ing, or any and all other activities and practices." 102 CoNG. REC. 2702-03 (daily ed. Feb.
25, 1956). And see BARRETT, THE TENNEY CommITmE. 15-16 (1951) (quoting authorizing
resolution).
109. See Chamberlain, A Generation of Legislative Alarm, in THE STATES AND SUB-
vEnsIoN 243-45 (Gellhorn ed. 1952) ; Harsha, The Broyles Commission, in id. at 66-75;
CARR, op. cit. supra note 105, at 280-84 (1952) ; cf. United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d
82, 92 (2d Cir. 1947) (holding discrimination in choice of subjects of investigation not
unconstitutional).
110. The Supreme Court cannot act unless there is a "case" or "controversy." U.S.
CoNsr. art. III, § 2. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1946) ; Federation
of Labor v. MeAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945).
111. Most cases involving the constitutional limits of the investigating power have
been federal prosecutions against witnesses under 11 STAT. 155 (1857), as amended, 2
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the witness had invoked the First Amendment as grounds for refusal to testify,
the trial court should acquit him.
Although this would be effective in freeing witnesses from the necessity of
answering certain questions, it would by no means cover every instance of
abridgment by a committee. At least three recurrent situations would probably
remain largely beyond the reach of the courts, for procedural reasons :112 where
U.S.C. § 192 (1952), which makes it a federal crime to wilfully refuse to testify or wil-
fully refuse to produce documents before a congressional committee. Under these statutes
a witness who refuses to testify is prosecuted by a United States attorney when the com-
mittee he offended reports the facts to its parent chamber and the President or Speaker
of the chamber certifies them to the United States attorney. 11 STAT. 156 (1857), as
amended, 2 U.S.C. § 194 (1952).
On occasion both houses of Congress have punished contumacious witnesses without
resort to the courts, exercising their common law powers as legislative chambers. E.g.,
Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935) ; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) ;
Stewart v. Blaine, 8 D.C. (1 MacArth.) 453 (1874). In these cases judicial review was
obtained by the witness' action for false arrest brought against the Sergeant-At-Arms or
Speaker who caused his arrest, or else by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. But the
common law procedure is rarely used. See It re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 671 (1897).
In one recent case a witness was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1952) for wilfully
obstructing a congressional committee, but the count was dismissed by the district court.
United States v. Starkovich, 1. Civ. Lia. DocK. § 340.4 (W.D. Wash. 1955).
Enforcement proceedings in cases involving state committees are similar. E.g., In re
Battelle, 207 Cal. 227, 277 P. 725 (1929) (common law punishment for contempt) ; People
ex rel. McDonald v. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463, 2 N.E. 615 (1885) (same); Ohio v. Morgan, 164
Ohio St. 529, 133 N.E.2d 104 (1956) (criminal prosecution). But in some states investigating
procedure provides for obtaining a court order compelling a witness to answer, and only the
witness' subsequent recalcitrance is contempt. E.g., Attorney General v. Brissenden, 271
Mass. 172, 171 N.E. 82 (1930) ; Matter of Barnes, 204 N.Y. 108, 97 N.E. 508 (1912) ; cf.
Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 105 A.2d 756 (1954). A similar procedure for federal in-
vestigations has been suggested, TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST 261. (1955), but is not yet
available, cf. Mins v. McCarthy, 209 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
The First Amendment issue may also arise in a prosecution of a witness for allegedly
giving perjured testimony to a committee. See United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847,
851 (D.C. Cir. 1954). However, in perjury prosecutions the Court might hold that the
witness has waived his First Amendment objection to committee questions by answering
them. See note 118 infra.
112. If the government brings no action and the investigated individual attempts to
sue as plaintiff for redress he will either ask for money damages or injunction and declara-
tory judgment. In the money damage suit he will be met with objections of: legislators'
immunity for their official speech, e.g., Kilbourne v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880);
sovereign immunity, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1952) (Federal Tort Claims Act does
not waive governmental immunity for defamation); the immunity of high government
officers in the scope of their authority, e.g., Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950); United States being a necessary party to suits against
officials, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1948).
If he sues for an injunction and/or declaratory judgment he will also meet obstacles:
his standing to sue, e.g., United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), but see
Adler v. Becard of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952) ; separation of powers, e.g., Fischler
v. McCarthy, 117 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 218 F.2d 164 (1954) ;
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a witness gives testimony in secret session which is later published ;113 where
a witness who refuses to answer a question is publicly called a "First Amend-
ment Communist" or similar epithet, but is not prosecuted for contempt ;114
and where a person is not himself called to the stand but is identified and has
his political beliefs or activities discussed by other witnesses. 1 5 A judicial
solution to the first two problems is unlikely."1 6 In the third situation the courts
cannot prevent public denunciations by "friendly" witnesses, but they can pro-
tect those "unfriendly" witnesses who invoke the protection of the First Amend-
ment.
Deterrence of onlookers-the crux of the abridgment here-follows as sure-
ly when a witness is asked about someone else's activities as when he is ques-
tioned about his own. If the other person is identified and subjected to hostile
publicity the deterrent effect on the onlooker is no less than if the witness him-
self were singled out. But there is virtually no way such a third person iden-
cf. Mins v. McCarthy, 209 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1953) ; political question, e.g., Colegrove
v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); exhaustion of remedies, e.g., Aircraft & Diesel Corp. v.
Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 (1947); equity discretion to decline jurisdiction, e.g., Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Research has produced only five cases in
which a person sought relief against federal legislative investigation before the govern-
ment brought contempt proceedings against him, and in all five cases the attempt at judi-
cial relief failed: Mins v. McCarthy, supra (semble: separation of powers) ; Hearst v.
Black, 87 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (same) ; Methodist Federation for Social Action v.
Eastland, Civil No. 1845-56, D.D.C., May 25, 1956 (same; congressional privilege) ; Fisch-
ler v. McCarthy, supra (venue, no federal jurisdictional amount, ripeness, separation of
powers); Hutner v. McCarthy, Civil No. 89-364, S.D.N.Y., Dec. 8, 1953 (no written
opinion); cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951).
Different results may obtain in state courts since state investigating procedure is often
different from federal; state courts are not restricted to hearing only "cases and contro-
versies," and their doctrines of standing to sue are often less rigid. Compare Greenfield
v. Russel, 292 Ill. 392, 127 N.E. 102 (1920) (taxpayer allowed to enjoin State Treasurer
from paying out public funds to an unconstitutional investigating committee), with Massa-
chusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (federal taxpayer has no standing to sue to enjoin
payment of public funds) ; and compare Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 105 A.2d 756 (1954)
(witness subpoenaed by state investigators may get declaratory judgment as to permissible
scope and manner of testifying), with, e.g., Fischler v. McCarthy, supra (refusing similar
relief to witness subpoenaed by federal investigators).
113. Concerning this practice see authorities cited in note 14 supra. In a state case
now pending a private citizen is attempting to enjoin publication by an investigating com-
mittee of a list of subversives. Tormey v. Bowker, 1 Civ. LIB. DocK. § 170.3 (Mass. Sup.
Jud. Ct. 1956). In an earlier case in the same state the plaintiff lost for lack of standing
to sue. Kaplan v. Bowker, 1 Civ. Lm. DocK. § 170.2 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1955).
114. On the practice of committees insulting uncooperative witnesses, see CAR, op.
cit. supra note 105, at 216; TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST 3, 184-85 (1955) ; Govennuent Print-
ing Office Hearings 64; cf. TAYLOR, op. cit. supra at 117-20.
115. See CARR, op. cit. supra note 105, at 181-82, 315-19. Many proposed codes of
procedure for committees have been directed to this problem. See, generally, EuMaasoN &
HABER, op. cit. supra note 84, at 456-58.
116. See text at note 134 infra.
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tified by the witness can raise the question in the courts.117 Such protection
as the judiciary can throw around him must be invoked by the witness who is
on the stand, or not at all. If the witness is a "cooperative" one, he may ignore
the First Amendment privilege, and discuss the political affairs of other per-
sons, 118 and there is probably nothing the courts can do about it. But if the
witness is unwilling to testify about the activities of others, he should be able
to refuse to do so on First Amendment grounds without fear of a contempt
conviction, even if his own activities are not the subject of inquiry.119
At first glance such a witness would seem to be trying to enforce the rights
of third persons, which he cannot do unless he runs the maze of cases involv-
117. To get redress the third person must bring suit as a civil plaintiff, encountering
all the obstacles mentioned in note 112 supra. As is pointed out in the note cited, the
problem may not be so grave in the state courts as in the federal.
118. Whether a witness before an investigating committee can waive, and what con-
stitutes waiver of the First Amendment privilege for himself and third persons, have not
been discussed by the courts. In contempt prosecutions under 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1952), a
witness may raise the defense that the question he refused to answer was not pertinent
although he did not make the same claim at the time he was asked the question by the
investigating committee. Bowers v. United States, 202 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1953). But
in such prosecutions the self-incrimination privilege is waived unless claimed properly
before the committee. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 164-65 (1955) (dictum). In
United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1954), the court assumed that a
witness did not waive his First Amendment privilege by testifying freely to an investigat-
ing committee, but found that the questions asked him were not privileged.
The closest Supreme Court case is Ullmann v. United States, 24 U.S.L. W=s. 4147,
4152 n.15 (U.S. Mar. 26, 1956), where the Court upheld the conviction of a grand jury
witness who had refused to answer questions about his own and other persons' member-
ship in the Communist Party. The Court treated the First Amendment defense of the
witness as waived. The precise time at which the waiver occurred is not, however, made
clear. Compare United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 330-33 (1950) (defense that com-
mittee had no quorum treated as waived since witness' refusal to give records to commit-
tee was not in fact based on that defense).
119. The suggested application of the First Amendment would create a privileged topic
about which committees could not compel testimony for unrestricted publication. The
mechanics of the privilege would be similar to the privilege for trade secrets now recog-
nized in civil litigation. See, generally, 8 WIGMoRE, EVmENC § 2212 (3d ed. 1940). The
policy of the proposed privilege would be closer to the existing privilege for political votes:
"to secure the entire independence of the electors, to enable them to vote according to their
own individual convictions of right and duty, without the fear of giving offense or exciting
the hostility of others." 8 id. § 2214.
Wigmore has argued against enlarging the testimonial privilege to cover political
opinion, ibid., and his result is compatible with the suggested application of the First
Amendment. Since the least abridgment test only bars unnecessary abridgments, public
testimony about politics may be compelled in court where it is subject to strict rules of
relevancy and where there is no other way in which the triers of fact can get the informa-
tion in a public trial. However, the privilege should obtain in public committee examina-
tions of witnesses where the rules of pertinency provide very little control and publicity
is not necessary to ensure a fair "trial." Of course there should be no privilege if there is
no danger of publicity. See text at notes 134-35 infra.
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ing the "standing" of a litigant to sue to enforce the rights of others ;120 but
on closer analysis this problem dissolves. The "standing to sue" issue arises
only when a plaintiff attempts to assert the rights of third persons ;121 where,
as in the case of the witness prosecuted for contempt, the interests of third
persons are invoked by a defendant the real question is that of his substantive
defenses 122 and unconstitutionality of a question asked is clearly a defense to
a prosecution for refusing to answer it.' 2 3 The remaining issue is the proper
way of testing the unconstitutionality of the question: is it bad if it abridges
any part of the political process, or is it bad only if it abridges the defendant's
own political freedom? If the previous analysis was correct, the amendment is
concerned with deterrence of any part of the political process. Compulsory
public questioning is unconstitutional if it unnecessarily abridges anyone's
political activity or discriminates between candidates or government programs.
It is immaterial whether the unnecessary or discriminatory questions concern
the witness or another person. The effect on observers is the same in either
event. 2 4 Since a question about other people's politics is unconstitutional, the
witness should be allowed to plead this in his own defense when prosecuted
for contempt.1 2 This is especially true in the context of legislative investi-
120. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150-56 (1951)
(concurring opinion). See, generally, HART & WEcHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 156-92 (1953).
121. See, generally, id. at 156-75.
122. The term "defendant's standing" has been used to describe the issue of whether
the defendant will be allowed to challenge a statute "on its face"-i.e., as it may be applied
in other instances than his own. See id. at 176-92. A witness cited for contempt would
not have to challenge the committee's resolution on its face to invoke the least abridgment
test even if the question he refused to answer concerned the activities of another person.
In that instance his challenge would be not to the application of the resolution on other
hypothetical occasions, but to the specific question asked him.
To raise the First Amendment's nondiscrimination test as a defense in a contempt
prosecution, the defendant would either have to prove discrimination occurred in his case
or else challenge the resolution on its face. Such a challenge was permitted in United
States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 1947), and denied in Barsky v. United States,
167 F.2d 241, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (semble).
123. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) ; Bowers v. United States, 202 F.2d
447 (D.C. Cir. 1953). Constitutionally privileged answers may be withheld without in-
curring criminal liability. E.g., Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) (self-incrimi-
nation). Compare Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953) (unconstitutional ap-
plication of a valid law may not be raised as a defense in enforcement proceedings where
government has provided regular channel for judicial review of application of law).
124. See text at pp. 1179-SO, and note 100 supra; cf. Barsky v. United States, 167 F2d
241,246 (D.C. Cir. 1948) :
"We note at this point that the arguments directed to the invalidity of this inquiry
under the First Amendment would apply to an inquiry directed to another person as
well as one directed to the individual himself."
125. If the First Amendment creates a testimonial privilege as described in note 118
supra, the defendant in contempt proceedings should be able to plead as a defense that the
answer was privileged and the fact that the privilege was for the protection of another
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gations, where the third person, whose activities the question concerns, is un-
able to defend his own rights because of procedural obstacles. 126
When, as in this context, an individual has attempted to justify nonperform-
ance of a legal duty on the ground that performance would involve violating
the constitutional rights of third persons, the Court has permitted the de-
fense.127 However, where a party tries to justify nonperformance of a statutory
obligation on the ground that the statute, although constitutional as applied in
the present instance, would be unconstitutional if applied in another hypotheti-
cal case the Court has generally rejected the argument. 128 In a few First
Amendment cases the rule has been relaxed and such a challenge to a statute
"on its face" has been permitted. 2 9
The judicial application of the First Amendment to committees depends,
then, upon the witness. He can, in an appropriate case, invoke the amendment
as grounds for refusing to answer, and if the committee has him cited for con-
tempt, his claim should be upheld by the courts. The appropriate case for such
invocation of the amendment has been indicated only in prototype; a more com-
prehensive definition of the circumstances in which the First Amendment
applies is necessary. This definition must provide a guide to the degree of
publicity that condemns a congressional inquiry, and a way of distinguishing
between questions that may be asked and those that may not.
person and not himself should not matter. Cf. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951)
(husband not guilty of contempt for refusing to disclose privileged communication from
his wife).
126. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 187 (1951)
(concurring opinion). It may be that if no one has an opportunity in any forum at any
time to challenge the constitutionality of the question asked the witness about a third
person, enforcement proceedings against the witness in a federal court will violate article
III of the Constitution, or the Due Process Clause. See HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra
note 120, at 312-40.
127. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) ; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 143 (1943); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940). When a person who
would normally be the defendant in a government action to enforce a statute brings a
declaratory judgment or injunction suit to determine whether it is constitutional, the Court
has permitted him to raise the question of whether the statute requires him to take action
which would impair the constitutional rights of third persons. E.g., American Communi-
cations Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 393, 402-05 (1950) ; Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943) (parent can test validity of law punishing him for failure to send
his children to a school, where they will be compelled to salute the flag in violation of their
religious beliefs).
128. E.g., Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S. 571 (1915); Yazoo & Miss. Valley
R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912); Southern Ry. v. King, 217 U.S. 524
(1910). Where the statute in question was federal, the Court has sometimes allowed the
argument. E.g., The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 500-02 (1908) ; The Trade-
Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 98-99 (1880) ; United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876). But
see Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419 (1938) ; The Abby Dodge, 223 U.S.
166 (1912).
129. E.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1.951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558
(1948) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). But see, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569 (1941).
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Publication
Unless the testimony is published in a way that may cause people to dis-
criminate against the persons investigated because of their politics, neither the
witness nor others are deterred from exercising political rights. Commonly
witnesses are interrogated by legislative committees in open session, with the
press and perhaps television and radio present, so that broad publication is
simultaneous with the witness' disclosure. In such circumstances, if the ques-
tion concerns forbidden topics, the witness should be able to refuse to answer
it because the likelihood of publication and deterrence of observers is so great.
More difficulty arises if the witness is questioned in private-in executive
session-where there is no immediate likelihood of publication. Whether or
not the content of the testimony will be released in a way that will cause
popular hostility against the people under investigation depends upon future
acts of the committee. In the past, committees have refused to give witnesses
a pledge of secrecy, 130 and have revealed a great deal of what they gleaned in
private session. 13' Facts obtained in executive session have later been released
in press conferences, reports to the legislature, and pamphlets published by
the committees, and have been dispensed from committee files for the con-
venience of employers desiring to discriminate against the blacklisted people. 132
Many committees seem to have considered it their duty to inform the voters of
the identity of individuals with undesirable political tendencies, so that these
people might be more easily recognized and ostracized in the future.133 Even
when the committees have not made deliberate efforts to identify the politics
of specific people, the information has often "leaked" to the press. 34
In the light of this history and of the dilemma of the witness who himself
is unable to predict the committee's course of conduct, the courts should pre-
sume that all compulsory testimony given an investigating committee will even-
tually be published unless special circumstances are shown that make pub-
lication very unlikely. One circumstance overcoming the presumption of pub-
lication would be a committee promise to prevent publication of the testimony
in a manner that would allow anyone to identify the person whose political
activities the testimony was about. Where such a pledge was extended the
courts and the witness should assume it would be honored, and the witness
130. See United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953) (witness who refused
to produce subpoenaed business records because Kefauver Committee would not pledge
secrecy for their contents held guilty of contempt).
131. See note 14 supra; CARR, op. cit. supra note 105, at 153-65; cf. N.Y. Times, Feb.
28, 1956, p. 1, col. 2 (House Un-American Activities Committee releases information on
Manhattan Borough President) ; Mar. 27, 1956, p. 23, col. 1 (Senate Subcommittee on In-
ternal Security publishes the private papers of Harry Dexter White).
132. E.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1955, p. 1, col. 1; CARR, op. cit. supra note 105, at
153-65; TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST 244-47 (1955).
133. See note 19 supra.
134. See Ca, op. cit. supra note 105, at 153-65; TAYLOR, GRAm INQUEST 244-47
(1955).
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should be held in contempt if he still refused to testify. Neither witness nor
court could very well presume that the legislators would fail to keep confidence
once they had agreed to do so.
13 5
What Questions May Not be Asked
In general, any question should be permitted unless its answer would be
likely to deter lawful private political activity or belief. A witness prosecuted
for contempt cannot, of course, produce direct proof that deterrence would
have resulted had he answered; he should only be required to show that the
answer he refused to give was likely to deter protected behavior if published.
Whether or not a given answer was of this character would depend on a host
of factors, a few of which require attention here because they might be thought
to establish conclusively that a particular answer would or would not have the
effect of abridgment. Some of these critical variables concern the identity of
the person investigated; others concern the type of behavior under investiga-
tion.
Identity of the Person Investigated
Aliens, government employees and fictional persons often do not enjoy the
full range of political rights enjoyed by ordinary citizens, 36 and for this reason
it might be suggested that these three groups could be subjected to unlimited
investigation without serious impairment to lawful political activity. But these
persons play a significant part in the political process despite limitations on
their activities.' 37 Unrestricted investigation, even if it only deterred them from
exercising their limited rights, would still be sufficiently substantial abridgment
135. In case of a legislative breach of secrecy there would be no redress in court, but
legislatures can enforce their own rules of secrecy. See Ex parte Nugent, 18 Fed. Cas. 471,
No. 10375 (C.C.D.C. 1848).
136. E.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586 nn.9 & 10 (1952) (aliens);
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (government employees); cf.
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948) (fictional persons). See, generally, Comment,
The Expatriation Act of 1954, 64 YALE L.J. 1164, 1166-69 (1955) (aliens) ; Chang, Labor
Political Action and the Taft-Hartley Act, 33 NEB. L. REv. 554, 561 n.37 (unions);
EMERSON & HABER, POLITICAL & Civi. RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 344-46 (1952)
(government employees).
137. On the part unions play in the political process despite laws restricting their
campaign contributions, see Chang, sapra note 136; Hudson & Rosen, Union Political
Action: the Member Speaks, 7 IND. & LAB. REL. Rav. 404 (1954). On the current role
of corporations see KEy, POLITICS, PARTIES AND PREssuRE GROUPS 554-55 (3d ed. 1952).
Government employees are not prevented from voting and expressing political opinions,
even if they are prevented from more active campaigning by the Hatch Act. United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94 (1,946). But their freedom to express left-wing
opinions may have been curtailed by the federal loyalty program. See Emerson and Helfeld,
Loyalty Ainwng Governnent Employees, 58 YALE L.J. 1, 76-79 (1948). Aliens, like fictional
persons, are denied the franchise in all forty-eight states. BooK OF THE STATES 1955-56,
at 84-85. But they are permitted to express their political opinions, contribute to campaign
funds, and help organize political groups.
1190 [Vol. 65 :1159
INQUIRY INTO POLITICAL ACTIVITY
to call the First Amendment into play.138 Moreover, the deterrence produced
by investigating any of these groups would not be confined to members of the
group unless ordinary citizens observing the inquiry felt sure that there was
no likelihood of similar investigations of themselves.
The Kind of Conduct Investigated
Since the First Amendment only protects lawful political activity or belief,
an argument might be made that questions about nonpolitical activity or about
political activity which is illegal cannot violate the policy of the amendment.
Generally, questions about nonpolitical behavior will not deter observers from
freely exercising their political rights and consequently such queries raise no
First Amendment issues.139
But questions about illegal political action (such as bribery, sedition or un-
registered lobbying), require special consideration since compulsory public in-
terrogation about these matters is likely to cause observers to refrain from law-
ful as well as unlawful efforts to influence the government. For example,
membership in the Communist Party may be illegal under the Smith Act,140
and consequently unprotected by the First Amendment. But the glare of un-
favorably publicity thrown on Party members by legislative committees may
138. The argument for free investigation of these groups would rest on the assump-
tion that existing restrictions on them have been held constitutional because the groups
lack First Amendment protection afforded other persons. But these groups are protected
by the First Amendment, and curtailment of their political action must meet the same con-
stitutional tests as curtailment of other persons' activities. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952) (government employee) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (alien,
corporation) ; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (corporation) ; cf.
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953) (dictum) (alien); United
States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 154-55 (1948) (concurring opinion) (unions and corpora-
tions).
Of course, under the least abridgment test, see text at notes 76-78 supra, what is
"necessary" in the case of these people may not be "necessary" in the case of ordinary
citizens if the occasion for legislative action is a problem peculiar to these classes of people.
Cf. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (fitness for government employ-
ment); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 591-92 (1952) (deportation of undesirable
alien); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (spoils system). Garner
v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951), appeared to ignore the least abridgment
test in cases of government employees, but subsequent cases have restored it. Wieman v.
Updegraff, supra (discharge for innocent membership in groups advocating force or vio-
lence is unconstitutional) ; Adler v. Board of Education, suPra at 492-93 (discharge of
teacher for membership in a group advocating force and violence is constitutional because
this is only practical way to ferret out subversive propaganda in schools).
139. Questions may, of course, raise serious problems under other parts of the Con-
stitution. See, Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955) (self-incrimination) ; cf.
Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 262-63 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (dissenting opinion) (due
process).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1952). See United States v. Lightfoot, 228 F.2d 861 (7th Cir.
1955), cert. granted, 24 U.S.L. WEuc 3252 (U.S. Mar. 26, 1956) ; Scales v. United States,
227 F.2d 581 (4th Cir. 1955).
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well keep observers from joining other groups not in themselves unlawful and
only similar to the Party in that they are also in the shadow of community dis-
approval. In the case of criminal prosecutions under the Smith Act this "pe-
numbra of deterrence" is unavoidable, for trials must be public. But there is
no similar necessity justifying public legislative investigation of political crime.
A practical difficulty would obstruct any effort to allow public questions about
political crimes while forbidding public probing of lawful political activity. In
order to make an intelligent investigation a committee would inevitably have to
ask questions about lawful politics as a background to its questions about crime.
It would frequently be impossible to tell whether the question which a witness
refused to give was one concerning legal or illegal political effort; even the
relatively specific crime of bribery rapidly shades off into the nuances of lawful
contributions to campaign funds.
A possible exception to the rule barring public investigation of politics might
be urged for inquiries into "direct lobbying." In the Harriss case 141 the Court
sustained a federal law requiring professional lobbyists to register and publish
information about their finances, their activities and the identity of their em-
ployers.142 In order to avoid First Amendment difficulties the Court construed
the statute to apply only to persons involved in "direct" lobbying, entailing
face-to-face contact with legislators, and not to those whose lobbying was "in-
direct.' 43 The Court recognized that such registration and publication had a
deterrent effect on legitimate political activity, 44 but found that it was justi-
fied, as to "direct lobbying," by the fact that Congress needed information
about professional groups in order to gauge properly the extent to which they
represented public opinion. 145
The fact that the Court held a law requiring disclosures by professional
direct lobbyists constitutional does not imply that public legislative investiga-
tion of direct lobbying would also be constitutional. The Court in Harriss
pointed out that the statute was no broader than necessary to accomplish its
purpose. 46 The information required by the statute was narrowly restricted, 147
and publication-printed reports in the Congressional Record 148-was hardly
flamboyant. Furthermore, there could be no discrimination in the selection of
persons about whom the publication was made, since all direct lobbyists were
required to answer the same questions. 49 The slight deterrence of lawful
political activity caused by the statute was, therefore, justified under First
141. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
142. Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 60 STAT. 839 (1946), 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70
(1952).
143. 347 U.S. at 617-26.
144. Id. at 625-26.
145. Ibid.
146. Id. at 626.
147. Id. at 625.
148. Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 60 STAT. 841-42 (1946), 2 U.S.C. § 267
(1952).
149. Id., 60 STAT. 840, 841 (1946), 2 U.S.C. §§ 262, 266-67 (1952).
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Amendment criteria. 3 0 But in the case of legislative investigations of direct
lobbying, carried on with the usual attendant publicity, a different situation
would be presented. The variety of information publicized and the extent of
publication would be considerably broader, and the deterrence correspondingly
greater. And committee investigations would present an element of discrimi-
nation,"' which was carefully avoided in the statute held constitutional in the
Harriss decision. The conclusion should be that direct lobbying, like any other
part of the political process, is protected by the First Amendment against pub-
licized investigation by the committees of Congress.
A Formula for Application by the Courts
As a practical matter the courts will have to use presumptions in deciding
what questions a committee may properly ask. It has already been pointed out
that since the constitutionality of a question depends upon the extent to which
it deters lawful participation in the political process, and since this is not sus-
ceptible of direct proof, the courts will have to infer the likelihood of deterrence
from a given question. The question remains whether inference should be
carried a step further, to establish broad categories of questions and circum-
stances in which deterrence vould be presumed without further inquiry. It is
submitted that the courts should take just this course, establishing a per se rule
for determining when a question violates the First Amendment. Certain cate-
gories of questions should be declared unconstitutional without requiring proof
of the actual likelihood of their causing deterrence in a specific instance. The
alternative would be to make an ad hoc determination of the likelihood of
deterrence in each instance, taking into consideration all the variables that
determine the probable effect of a committee's question. 152 The loss from us-
ing a per se rule would be slight. In some situations the rule might protect
too much, cutting out questions that in their context would not have actually
abridged political freedom. But in those instances a committee would not be
kept from asking the questions; it would only be required to ask them without
publicity. Occasionally the rule might protect too little, but some liberality in
drawing its dimensions could cure this defect. On the other hand, the dis-
advantages of leaving the issue to ad hoc determination would be considerable.
There is, first of all, a real need for certainty in this area. A witness on the
150. 347 U.S. at 625,626.
151. A committee investigation of lobbying, unless it were to call lobbyists by lot or
call all lobbyists for investigation, would have to exercise discretion in selecting which
lobbies to examine and which to ignore. The results of such selection are indicated in text
following note 109 supra.
152. Deterrence would vary with the type of political behavior revealed; the person-
ality, social status and reputation of the person exposed; the amount and type of publicity
given the expose; the composition of the audience to which the person was exposed; the
audience's opportunity to impose sanctions on the person; the extent to which persons m
the audience feared similar sanctions against themselves; the number of persons who
feared them; how strongly motivated they were to overcome their fear.
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stand needs to know whether he can safely invoke the First Amendment as
grounds for refusing to answer a question: if he refuses to answer and later
finds he guessed wrong, he may be convicted of contempt ;153 if he answers and
later learns that he need not have, there is no redress for him or for others
whose rights have been abridged. He must decide quickly and correctly, and
a vague rule may be worse than no rule at all. Predictability is equally im-
portant for the committee counsel trying to keep his questions within constitu-
tional bounds: he must know when he is entitled to force a witness to speak up,
and when he should conduct his questioning in executive session. Finally, some
certainty about the rules is appropriate for other congressmen and citizens
trying to evaluate the fairness of the committees' performance154 An ad hoc
rule would provide almost none of this necessary certainty.
Ad hoc adjudication would leave the delineation of the law largely to the
district courts, since the crux of each decision would be "findings of fact" and
the scope of appellate review would be limited. Such piecemeal development
by inferior courts would not encourage legislative self-restraint. Moreover, a
proper regard for the delicate question of the separation of legislative and
judicial powers should lead the Supreme Court to draw the line between proper
and improper questioning itself, rather than delegating this task to the trial
judges.
The general rule should be that witnesses have the right to refuse to reply
to any question whose answer would describe the private political activities or
beliefs of any person-unless there are adequate guarantees that the answer
will not be published in a way that identifies the person. No exception should
be made for any category of persons or activities or for any category of political
activity or belief-legal or illegal. The test of what is "political" should be
whether the belief or the activity was intended to influence government policy
or the choice of government personnel. For those questions where the differ-
ence between political and nonpolitical subjects was blurred, some unpredict-
ability would remain. But the uncertainty would center on a single issue about
which a body of case law could easily be built; under an ad hoc rule, where a
number of variables are always considered, past cases would be of little help in
predicting future decisions.
In most cases scrutiny of the question asked a witness would indicate whether
the political process was involved, but even such a seemingly nonpolitical ques-
tion as "Where did you last see Harry Smith ?" might require an answer about
political activity. In such a case a witness who invoked the First Amendment
should be allowed to prove in defense to a contempt prosecution that he could
not in good faith have answered the question without discussing private poli-
tical beliefs or actions. Whether or not the investigation was primarily focused
153. In some states a committee witness need not face this dilemma; investigating
committees must get a court order to compel a recalcitrant witness to testify. In the pro-
ceeding for such an order the witness can get judicial review of the propriety of questions
asked him without risking a contempt conviction. See note 11.1 supra.
154. See Editorial, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1955, p. 22, col. 1.
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on political matters, the legality of a particular committee question should turn
on the nature of the answer it requires.
EFFECT OF THE RULE PROPOSED
If the rule here suggested were adopted by the Court, its immediate effect
would be to stop contempt convictions of committee witnesses who refused to
answer questions about their own or other persons' political activity or belief
in circumstances where publication of the answer was either automatic or very
probable. Such questions could be asked in secret if the committees agreed not
to identify specific individuals and groups when making their findings public.
When a pledge of secrecy was extended, refusal to answer would be punished
as contempt regardless of the subject with which the question dealt, so long as
other statutory and constitutional requirements, such as pertinency, 15 proper
authority,1 and no self-incrimination 157 were observed.
The solution offered is a limited one. A committee intent on exposure could
still hold political inquisitions that the courts would be powerless to reach. But
such practices would be unlikely in the face of a clear Supreme Court definition
of the limits the First Amendment places on public legislative investigation.
Such a holding would undoubtedly weigh heavily with responsible state and
federal legislators who would seek to implement its policy in situations beyond
judicial purview.
155. E.g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); Bowers v. United States,
202 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp. 791 (D. Mass. 1956).
156. E.g., Kilbourne v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) (committee lacked authority
to compel testimony because created for an improper purpose) ; Greenfield v. Russel, 292
111. 392, 127 N.E. 102 (1920) (taxpayer enjoins payment of funds to a committee because
it was performing improper function).
157. E.g., Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955) ; United States v. Doto, 205
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Marcello v. United States, 196 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1952).
The privilege against self-incrimination has been the most effective legal limit on the
scope of committee inquiry to date. EMERSON & HABER, Op. cit. supra note 136, at 454.
But under the Immunity Act of 1954, 68 STAT. 745, 18 U.S.C. § 3486(a),(b) (Supp. II,
1954). Congressional committees may be able to remove the self-incrimination privilege
by extending immunity from prosecution for the matters the witness is compelled to dis-
close. Immunity can only be extended if two-thirds of the full committee affirmatively vote
to authorize it and the local district court approves. The Attorney General may oppose
the committee's motion in the district court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the Immunity Act as applied to
a recalcitrant grand jury witness, but did not consider the sections of the act dealing with
investigating committees. Ullman v. United States, 24 U.S.L. W=x 4147, 4150 n.7 (U.S.
Mar. 26, 1956).
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